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The Japanese criminal justice system provides the criminally accused an
impressive set of legal protections. Although these protections came fully
into being only with the adoption of the 1947 Constitution and are, in great
measure, of continental and Anglo-American origin, they are highly
developed and safeguard the human rights of an accused at all stages of a
criminal proceeding. This article provides a comprehensive overview of the
protections afforded accused persons underJapanese law. It first explores the
historical sources of the safeguards built into modem Japanese criminal law
and procedure; next discusses the general treatment of rights and the
structure of the criminal justice system under the Japanese Constitution; and,
finally, addresses in detail both the substantive and procedural protections




A. Roots of the Present System
In contrast to the history of Western nations, including the United States,
in which the roots of diverse protections for the human rights of criminal
suspects and defendants lie generations or centuries in the past, the formal
recognition in Japan of a concept of "rights" for accused persons is almost
exclusively a consequence of the adoption of the present Sh6wa Constitution
of 1947. Moreover, a structure of formal criminal proceedings in Japan was
initiated only in 1882.i For that reason, to survey the current scope of the
protections afforded criminal suspects and defendants in Japan is to inquire
into a highly contemporary hybrid system of American concepts engrafted
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1. The Code of Criminal Instruction (Chizai h6) of 1880 took effect concurrently with the old
Penal Code on January 1, 1882. See generally S. DANDO,JAPANESE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 15-16
(B. George trans. 1965); R. ISHII, JAPANESE LEGISLATION IN THE MEUI ERA 512-24 (W. Chambliss
trans. 1958); Takayanagi, A Century of Innovation: The Development of Japanese Law, 1868-1961, in LAw
IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 5, 18-19 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963) [hereinafter
Law IN JAPAN].
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onto a root stock heavily influenced by late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century Continental European legal doctrines.
B. The Feudal Era
The earliest codifications of law in Japan, the Code of 702 (Taiho) and the
Code of 718 (Yo-ro), were heavily influenced by the slightly earlier Sui and
T'ang Codes of China. 2 Charges were instituted by government officials;
adjudications had to be based on either defendants' confessions or the
testimony of witnesses; 3 and appeals could be lodged against convictions.
However, as the imported code systems disintegrated in the succeeding feudal
eras of Kamakura 4 and Muromachi (Ashikaga), 5 the vestiges of the earlier
imported codes disappeared. Norms of conduct were disseminated in the
form of administrative criminal regulations enforced by bakufu officials either
locally or centrally. 6
After the succession to bakufu control by Tokugawa Ieyasu 7 and the
subsequent consolidation of effective Tokugawa clan hegemony over the
entire nation, 8 the administrative-criminal process instituted in earlier eras
continued unchanged.9 The norms to guide various bodies of people were
usually couched in general terms as moral rules and precepts. Because these
precepts were known and accepted by most persons, it was considered
unnecessary to promulgate specific explanations of the methods by which they
were to be enforced. Consequently, the emphasis in the criminal regulations
of the last century of the Tokugawa shogunate, l0 which were internal
documents for official guidance not disseminated to the populace, was on
such matters as methods to be taken to discover the truth from offenders' lips
and to execute condemned criminals. i
C. The Meiji Period
With the termination of the Tokugawa shogunal control of the Japanese
government and the restoration of power to the emperor,' 2 Japan embarked
on a rapid modernization of its political, economic, and legal apparatus.
2. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 12-13; 1 G. SANSOM, A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334, at 67-70
(1963).
3. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 13. If the evidence were evenly balanced concerning the truth
of the charges, a duty of compensation could be imposed based on suspicion only.
4. The feudal era of Kamakura was from 1185 to 1392. See generally 1 G. SANSOM, supra note 2,
at 345-58.
5. The feudal era of Muromachi was from 1392 to 1573. See generally 2 G. SANSOM, A HISTORY
OFJAPAN 1334-1615, 143-48, 300-02 (1963).
6. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 13-14.
7. Tokugawa Ieyasu's succession followed his brilliant suppression of contending feudal clan
leaders at the battle of Sekigahara in 1600. See 2 G. SANSOM, supra note 5, at 385-406.
8. See generally 3 G. SANSOM, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 1615-1867 (1963).
9. See Henderson, Some Aspects of Tokugawa Law, 27 WASH. L. REV. 85, 89-90 (1952).
10. In particular, O-Sadame-Gaki (1742), including the Code of 100 Articles (Hyakkaj6). See
Henderson, supra note 9, at 90; Takayanagi, supra note 1, at 16.
11. See Henderson, supra note 9, at 108.
12. See generally W. BEASLEY, MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN 76-116 (3d ed. 1982); C. TOTMAN,
COLLAPSE OF THE TOKUGAWA BAKUFU, 1862-1868 (1980).
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Perhaps the strongest objective for the reform of the legal apparatus was to
provide a basis to negotiate away the treaties with Western powers, including
the treaty with the United States, that provided extraterritorial protections for
westerners in Japan. 3 As part of the process, a criminal procedure code and a
penal code were adopted,' 4 both of which substantially resembled the French
codes of the time.' 5
However, far more significant in the development of the concept of human
rights within the criminal process was the emperor's promulgation of a
constitution in 1889.16 That document, however, was based on the Prussian
pattern' 7 and not on the pattern presupposed as standard in the United
States. Consequently, the constitution was in the nature of a "fundamental
law of State" by which the emperor exhibited the principles that would guide
imperial conduct.' 8 Under Chapter II, headed "Rights and Duties of
Subjects,"' 9 only four areas were addressed relating to the administration of
criminal justice: (1) arrest, detention, trial, or punishment had to be
"according to law;" 20 (2) trial had to be conducted by judges, as determined
by law; 21 (3) the houses ofJapanese subjects could not be entered or searched
without consent "except in cases provided for by law"; 2 2 and (4) secrecy of
correspondence was to remain inviolate "except in instances mentioned in the
law." 23 Because, as matters of both theory and form, the emperor had to
approve the promulgation of statutes through an imperial edict, 24 there was
no basis whatever to view these or any other provisions of Chapter II as
creating "rights that the people can claim as human beings"; they were only
"rights of the subjects" given by the "will of the emperor." 25
13. See W. BEASLEY, supra note 12, at 159-60.
14. Between 1869 and January 1, 1882, there were several interim substantive and procedural
enactments under which important steps were taken to adopt both penal norms and a criminal justice
system that resembled those established in France. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 14-16; R.
ISHII, supra note 1, at 17, 333-42; Armstrong, A Perspective on Japanese Criminal Law and Procedure, 5
LAWASIA 179, 185-86 (1974); Henderson, supra note 9, at 88-90; Takayanagi, supra note 1, at 19-20;
Wren, Legal System of Pre- Western Japan, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 231-32 (1968).
15. See G. BOISSONADE, PROJET REVISt DE CODE PENAL POUR L'EMPIRE DU JAPON ACCOMPAGNt
D'UN COMMENTAIRE (1886); R. IsHII, supra note 1, at 562-63; K. NAKAMURA, FORMATION OF JAPANESE
LAW AS VIEWED FROM LEGAL HISTORY 73 (1962). Gustave Emile Boissonade de Fontarabie (1825-
1910), a professor on the Faculty of Law at the University of Paris, served as an adviser to the
Government of Japan on legal matters for over 20 years. See Y. NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE
LAW 45-48 (A. Angelo trans. 1976).
16. See generally R. ISHII, supra note 1, at 366-81; N. MATSUNAMI, JAPANESE CONSTITUTION AND
POLITICS 37-40 (1940); Takayanagi, supra note 1, at 6-9.
17. See R. ISHII, supra note 1, at 366-67, 369; N. MATSUNAMI, supra note 16, at 37-38; Armstrong,
supra note 14, at 184-85.
18. MEIJI CONST. preamble (Dai Nippon Teikoku Kemp6). See also N. MATSUNAMI, supra note 16,
at 53-56 (imperial speech upon the promulgation of the constitution).
19. MEIJI CONST. ch. II.
20. Id. art. 23.
21. Id. art. 24.
22. Id. art. 25.
23. Id. art. 26.
24. See S. FUJIl, ESSENTIALS OFJAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 332-34 (1940).
25. Miyasawa, Kempo Constitutional Law (1962), translated in H. TANAKA, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM:
INTRODUCTORY CASES AND MATERIALS 630, 637 (1976) (emphasis in original). Statutes, in theory,
could never be contrary to the constitution, see S. FujII, supra note 24, at 334, but there were no
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D. The Contemporary Constitutional Setting
The adoption of the 1947 Sh6wa Constitution signaled, of course, a
revolution in the assumptions on whichJapanese constitutional law rested and
the establishment both of constitutional or human rights and of a mechanism
to enforce them. Although in form an amended version of the Meiji
Constitution, 26 the Sh6wa Constitution rather clearly was a new document
substantially influenced by pressure from the Supreme Commander Allied
Powers ("SCAP") for basic changes in the structure of government polity and
law. 27 Through its adoption, Japan entered an era in which human rights,
including those of suspects and accused persons, became a viable, enforceable
concept.
III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCT FOR RIGHTS OF ACCUSED
PERSONS
A. The Constitutional Status of Rights
As noted,28 the Meiji Constitution granted nothing that could be viewed as
"rights"; not only were the purported rights all qualified by phrases like
"except as provided by law," but the term "right" itself was alien to the
traditional Japanese ethos.29 Hence, only the coverage of "duties" was
consistent with traditional Japanese values. The present Constitution
continues the chapter heading of "Rights and Duties of the People," 30
perhaps in large measure because in form it is an amended version of the
Meiji Constitution. 31 However, the duties that the Constitution imposes are
highly restricted,3 2 and the rights it confers are to remain untrammelled by
specific, unqualified provisions affecting penal law and procedure, so the reservation was
meaningless; in any event, there was no mechanism to invalidate legislation on constitutional
grounds, id.; but see id. at 315-16 (proper not to apply a law found to be in conflict with the
constitution). See also N. MATSUNAMI, supra note 16, at 226-27.
26. The instrument of promulgation by the Emperor on November 3, 1946, made express
reference to Article 73(1) of the Meiji Constitution, which provided for the submission of a project
for amendment to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order.
27. Among the many resources addressing the processes leading to the promulgation of the
present constitution, see COMM'N ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
THE CONSTITUTION 62-86 (J. Maki trans. 1980) [hereinafter COMMISSION]; A. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM
IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 43-64 (1976); H. TANAKA, supra note 25, at 653-64; Armstrong, supra note 14, at
188-89; Ward, Origins of the Present Japanese Constitution, 50 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 980-82, 996-99, 1008-10
(1956).
28. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Y. NODA, supra note 15, at 44, 159-60; Beer & Weeramantry, Human Rights in Japan:
Some Protections and Problems, 1 UNIVERSAL HUM. RTs., July-Sept. 1979, at 1, 3-5; Takayanagi, supra note
1, at 24.
30. 1947 CONST. ch. III (arts. 10-40).
31. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
32. Four duties are imposed on the Japanese people: (1) spouses are to maintain marriage
through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis, 1947 CONST. art.
24(2); (2) those with minor children under their protection are obliged to see that they receive a
measure of ("ordinary") education fixed by law, id. art. 26(2); (3) all people have an obligation as well
as a right to work, id. art. 27(1); and (4) children cannot be exploited by anyone, id. art. 27(3). People
are also made liable to taxation as provided by law, id. art. 30, an obligation qualitatively different
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legislation or other governmental action.33 Although during the first two
decades of Japan's postwar constitutional regime there were minority
rumblings that more attention should be given to an expanded list of
enforceable constitutional duties imposed on the people,3 4 at present there
appears to be no mainstream support for major revisions of the Chapter to
limit or qualify rights and impose enforceable duties on the people.
Accordingly, an evaluation of the contemporary constitutional and statutory
rights of suspects and accused persons under the Japanese system uses a
methodology familiar to the legal profession of the United States.
B. The Structure for Enforcement of Rights
Although fairly elaborate administrative procedures are in place to protect
the constitutional rights of the Japanese people,3 5 the enforcement of
substantive and procedural rights in the course of criminal proceedings is
almost exclusively the responsibility of the courts through which criminal
cases move. Although the matter is covered in much greater detail elsewhere
in this symposium, 36 it seems useful to stress the organic changes the
from the preceding list and continued from the Meiji Constitution. See H. ITO, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN 45-48 (1906); N. MATSUNAMI, supra note 16, at 262-65.
Finally, there is a general exhortation that the people are to refrain from abusing the rights conferred
on them by the Constitution and are responsible for using them for the public welfare. 1947 CONST.
art. 12.
33. 1947 CONST. art. 11 ("[Tlhe people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the
fundamental human rights [which] shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations
as eternal and inviolate rights.").
34. See COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 280-81. It was also suggested, from a different
perspective, that old concepts of "rights and duties" should be replaced by a label of "welfare and
obligations of the people." Id. at 385. The Commission thought it preferable, however, to
emphasize Article 25 of the 1947 Constitution, which relates to the right of people "to maintain
minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living," and to the duty of the state in all aspects of
life to "use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of
public health," rather "than to strengthen limitations on the rights and freedoms of the people in the
name of the principles of the contemporary welfare state." Id.
35. See generally JAPAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN JAPAN (undated); Beer &
Weeramantry, supra note 29, at 6-13; Rosch, Institutionalizing Mediation: The Evolution of the Civil
Liberties Bureau in Japan, 21 LAW & Soc'v REV. 243 (1987).
36. See Itoh,Judicial Review andJudicialActivism injapan, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1990, at
169; Luney, The Judiciary: Its Organization and Status in the Parliamentary System, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter 1990, at 135.
One might note that Article 40 of the 1947 Constitution guarantees a right to persons arrested or
detained for a crime to sue the government for redress, under procedures established by law,
following acquittal. That practice was first implemented by the Keiji hosh6 h6 (Criminal
Compensation Law), Law No. 1, 1950, supplemented by the Keiji hosh6h6 kisoku (Rules Governing
Criminal Compensation) (Sup. Ct. Rule No. 1, 1950). See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 527-34.
A limited measure of compensation is available through administrative action to persons against
whom prosecution has not been instituted following arrest or detention. See George, Discretionary
Authority of Public Prosecutors in Japan, in LAw AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVES 263, 271-72 (J. Haley ed. 1988).
A more substantial legislative step was taken by Law No. 23, 1976 in Articles 188-2 to 188-6 of the
new Keisoh6 (Code of Criminal Procedure) to compensate acquitted accused persons for certain
costs. These persons are compensated for adjudication costs, other than those which the accused
person caused to arise, provided the prosecution did not result from false confessions or other
evidence provided by the accused during the investigative phase. Id. arts. 188-2(1), (2). Those
seeking indemnification must submit an application to the court that rendered the adjudication of
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Constitution made in the relationships between judges, public procurators,
and defense counsel. In the author's view, these changes have made it
possible to protect human rights effectively within the context of criminal
justice administration.
Under the system in force through 1946, both judges and procurators
were professional staff members of the Ministry ofJustice and could be shifted
through administrative action from one responsibility to another.37 During
the procedural phase of preliminary inquiry (yoshin), the public procurator,
sitting with the inquiring (examining) judge, examined the suspect and any
other witnesses 38 and compiled a dossier that would be transmitted to the
court if a decision to institute formal prosecution were reached.3 9 Trial
consisted exclusively of a hearing on the charges confirmed by a public
procurator, an examination of the accused in the absence of other witnesses, a
reading of the protocols, 40 and the taking of testimony of witnesses and
expert witnesses whose statements were not embodied in a protocol reflecting
the preliminary inquiry. 4' No right of representation by counsel arose until a
"suspect" had become an "accused person," which meant that counsel's role
was limited to impeaching the data reviewed by the court during public trial
proceedings and to making closing submissions concerning guilt and
sanctions. 42 Thus, schematically speaking, the system before 1946 could be
represented by an unstable inverted triangle, formed at the top by judges and
public procurators on an equal level, with counsel for the accused in an
inferior position.
not guilty within six months after that adjudication was entered. Id. arts. 188-3(1), (2).
Indemnification for appellate costs is available only if the public prosecutor lodged an appeal and the
appeal is thereafter either dismissed or withdrawn. Id. arts. 188-4 through 188-5. The basic
obligation of reimbursement extends to (a) travel expenses, per diem, and lodging expenses for the
accused or for defense counsel for the accused, relating to appearances in court either in preparation
for trial or on days of public trial, and (b) fees paid to defense counsel and witnesses. Id. art. 188-
6(1). If there are multiple defense counsel, reimbursement of actual expenses may be limited to the
chief defense counsel or some but not all counsel. Id. art. 188-6(2). The basic pattern of
compensation is that provided by the Criminal Compensation Law.
37. See H. QUIGLEY, JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 275, 276-77 (1932).
38. SeeJ. DE BECKER, ELEMENTS OF JAPANESE LAW 402-08 (1916) (Although this book describes
the proceedings under the Code of Criminal Instruction of 1882, a substantially equivalent
relationship existed between judges and public procurators under the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1927.); R. IsnII, supra note 1, at 525-28.
39. See J. DE BECKER, supra note 38, at 409. A key change in the present Code of Criminal
Procedure, art. 256(6), forbids the annexation of or reference to any evidentiary document or other
matter in an accusatory instrument (kisoj6). See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 346-47. The provision
clearly attests to the markedly altered relationship between judges and public prosecutors under the
present system. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
40. Under the current system, as well as the earlier one, the protocol is a special form of
procedural document in which occurrences in judicial proceedings are preserved for later use. It is
not, however, a "transcript" as the latter term is used in American practice. See S. DANDO, supra note
1, at 381-82 (citing CODE and RULE provisions).
41. SeeJ. DE BECKER, supra note 38, at 409-10; Takayanagi, supra note I, at 20-21.
42. Under both the former and present procedural systems (which are typical for Roman law-
based systems), a judgment of guilt covers both the legal conclusion of guilt and the sanctions to be
imposed, suspended, or remitted. See CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 333-34; S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 385-
86.
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Under the Sh6wa Constitution, the triangle has flipped. The judiciary,
with the Supreme Court at the apex,43 has become an independent organ of
government coordinate with the Diet. At the same time, the functions
allocated to defense counsel under the adversarial criminal procedure
established under the postwar Code of Criminal Procedure ("Code") have
brought the private bar into a formal state of equality44 with public
prosecutors, who continue to function within the Ministry of Justice.45
Accordingly, the system now forms a stable triangle, with the judiciary at the
apex and public prosecutors and defense counsel on a coordinate level at its
base. 46 This systemic change toward an Anglo-American pattern has been
both symbolically and functionally significant in safeguarding the
constitutional and statutory rights of suspects and accused persons, as the
following summary of those rights should confirm.
IV
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: SUBSTANTIVE PENAL LAW
Although the bulk of constitutional attention is devoted to procedural
matters, there are nonetheless certain constitutional doctrines that bear on
the validity of substantive penal law and not on the procedures through which
that penal law is enforced. Both substantive and procedural provisions,
however, concur to protect the criminally accused.
A. Article 31 Limitations
Article 31 of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived
of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except
according to procedure established by law." On its face, the provision seems
not to reflect any greater concern than that penal legislation be enforced
through procedures that conform to the Code and other laws and orders of
procedural significance, and thus should not be taken as the equivalent to the
due process clauses of the United States Constitution. 47 Nevertheless, the
43. 1947 CONST. arts. 76, 79. See generally Dando, Role of the Supreme Court in the Administration of
Criminal Justice in Japan, in FESTSCHRIFT FDR DIETRICH OEHLER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 635, 635-40 (R.
Herzberg ed. 1984); George, Japanese judicial System: Thirty Years of Transition, 12 Lov. L.A.L. REV.
807, 813-16 (1979).
44. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 103-05, 107-10; H. TANAKA, supra note 25, at 533;
Armstrong, supra note 14, at 200-02; Hattori, The Legal Profession in Japan: Its Historical Development and
Present State, in LAw IN JAPAN, supra note 1, at 111, 136-38.
45. See generally George, supra note 36, at 264.
46. Nevertheless, in the actual conduct of criminal investigations and the prosecution's initial
evaluation of criminal charges, as well as in the phase of precharging judicial activity, a lineal
structure is perhaps more helpful to understanding the system. This is because the police are
formally phased out, and courts and counsel for the accused are phased in when, but only when, the
public prosecutorial apparatus decides to file an accusatory instrument. See supra note 39. See
generally George, supra note 36, at 263, 267-68.
47. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1. See COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 280 (summarizing
opinion that language should be amended to "procedures of just and proper law" to clarify that
substantive as well as procedural conditions should be determined by law); H. TANAKA, supra note 25,
at 829 (indicating belief of many lawyers that Article 31 is equivalent to a due process clause because
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provision has become the basis for certain restrictions on the legislative
process that are independent of criminal procedure.
One restriction is that the legality principle, that is, the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege, 48 governs in Japan as a matter of constitutional law and
criminal norms must be established by statutes enacted by the Diet. Hence, in
contrast to the legal structure during the Meiji period when administrative
orders could provide for the imposition of criminal punishments, 49 Cabinet
orders cannot include penal provisions unless legislation expressly authorizes
them. 50  Article 31 has been invoked to challenge statutes and local
ordinances as vague and indefinite, although to date the Supreme Court of
Japan has not invalidated any of the provisions under attack.5 1
The companion norm of nulla poena sine lege likewise is incorporated in
Article 31, so that the scope and character of penalties for proscribed conduct
must be delineated through legislation. 52 A corollary is that punishments
must be just and commensurate with the harm addressed by a penal statute.
At least in terms of scholarly opinion, 53 this provision goes beyond the
prohibition against the infliction of "cruel punishments" 54 and builds into
Article 31 the dimension of proportionality that constitutes, in the United
States, one element of the constitutional prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishment. 5 5
of its SCAP inception, but noting an Indian Supreme Court construction of identical language as
meaning "procedure established by a statute," Gopalan v. State of Madras, 37 A.I.R. 27 (Sup. Ct.
1950)); Dando, Basic Concepts in and Temporal and Territorial Limits on the Applicability of the Penal Law of
Japan, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 237, 242-43 (1988) (Article 31 should be viewed as
equivalent to due process, embracing both a requirement that statutes be sufficiently precise to
afford notice and a requirement of precise penalty limits).
48. See generally J. HALL, LAW, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY 105-06 (1982).
49. The Meiji Constitution provided generally in Article 9 that the emperor issues or causes to
be issued ordinances, inter alia, for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and in Article 23
that Japanese subjects could be arrested, detained, tried, or punished only "according to law." The
Law Concerning the Punishment of Violations of the Provisions of Administrative Orders, Law No.
84, 1890, generally authorized criminal penalties of fines not to exceed 200 yen or penal detention
not to exceed one year. Under the Police Infraction Order, Ministry ofJustice Order No. 16, 1909, a
large number of penal regulations were issued on the strength of the 1890 law. See Dando, supra note
47, at 238.
50. 1947 CONST. art. 73(6). See generally Dando, supra note 47, at 238. As Professor Dando
notes, customary law can be used solely as a source of data bearing on the interpretation of statutory
language and not as an independent source of penal norms. Id. at 239. Precedent, at least from the
standpoint of scholarly analysis in Japan, only interprets a statutory text and does not create a penal
norm independent of legislation. Id. at 240.
51. See Dando, supra note 47, at 241 n.6 (citing and summarizing Supreme Court precedent).
Compare counterpart precedents of the United States Supreme Court. E.g., Boos v. Berry, 484 U.S.
808 (1987); Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
52. See Dando, supra note 47, at 240-41.
53. See id. at 242-43.
54. 1947 CONST. art. 36.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263 (1980).
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One might also note that the Supreme Court of Japan 56 invoked the
constitutional provision guaranteeing the equality of all persons under the law
and prohibiting discrimination in political, economic, or social relations
because of race, creed, sex, social status, or family origin 57 to invalidate the
penalty provisions of the Penal Code that mandated more severe sanctions for
killing a lineal ascendant 58 than for other forms of homicide. 59
B. Prohibition Against Cruel Punishments
As noted earlier, 60 the Constitution of Japan expressly prohibits cruel
punishments. The Supreme Court of Japan has ruled, however, that capital
punishment, 6 I-with hanging as the sole method of implementation
authorized in the Penal Code 62 -and life imprisonment 63 are not barred by
the provisions of Article 36. The consensus appears to be that the abolition of
the death penalty in Japan, if it comes, will be solely through a revision of the
Penal Code, not judicial action. 64
C. Nonretroactivity Principle
The principle forbidding the retroactive application of penal legislation
may be viewed as a corollary to the nullum crimen and nulla poena principles
discussed earlier. 65 In contrast to the Meiji Constitution, which contained no
express prohibition against retroactivity, 66 the present Constitution states
expressly that no person can be adjudicated guilty for an act that was lawful at
the time of its commission, 67 a provision similar to, if not identical with, the ex
post facto clauses of the United States Constitution. 68 This provision would
bar the retroactive application of harsher penalties even though the
underlying criminal definition remains unchanged, but would guarantee no
benefit to convicted persons if the penalties should be made less onerous than
56. Japan v. Nakamura, 16 Keishfi 1593 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 28, 1962) (translated in H. ITOH &
L. BEER, CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OFJAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 1961-70, at 58
(1978)).
57. 1947 CONST. art. 14(1).
58. KEISH6 (PENAL CODE) art. 200 (death or life imprisonment with forced labor).
59. Id. art. 199 (death or imprisonment with forced labor for life or a term not less than three
years).
60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61. See 1248 HanreiJih6 138 (Sup. Ct., 2d P.B.,July 17, 1987); 1242 HanreiJih6 131 (Sup. Ct.,
2d P.B., July 9, 1987). See generally S. DANDO, PENAL LAw OF JAPAN: GENERAL PART § 11.02(1) (B.
George trans., in press).
62. Japan v. Ichikawa, 15 Keishfi 1106 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 19, 1961); Japan v. Hirazawa, 9
Keisha 663 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 21, 1949) (interpreting PENAL CODE art. I1(1)). See generally S.
DANDO, supra note 61, § 11.02(2).
63. Japan v. Kobayashi, 3 Keishfil 2048 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 20, 1949); Japan v. Hiyoshi, 10
KeishQi 1611 (Sup. Ct., 3rd P.B., Dec. 25, 1956).
64. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN 16-18, 23-24 (1983); COMMISSION,
supra note 27, at 282-83.
65. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
66. See Dando, supra note 47, at 249.
67. 1947 CONST. art. 39.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 cl. 3, § 10 cl. 1. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987); Weaver v.
Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
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they were at the time of the criminal act. The latter benefit, however, is
provided for by the Penal Code, which states that "when a punishment is
changed by law after the commission of a crime, the lesser punishment shall
be applied." 69
V.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The bulk of the constitutional rights germane to this article relate to
procedure. Moreover, the provisions of the Code must be examined closely
in identifying the scope of protections afforded suspects and accused persons
under law, for the Code was revised in 1948 to meet the mandates of the
Constitution. A full exposition of Japanese criminal procedure far exceeds
the allotted space for this article. Nevertheless, with the exceptions noted
below, the protections delineated in the Code meet or exceed the minimum
standards set by the Constitution, thus the majority of criminal appeals are
resolved on the basis of code, not constitutional, interpretation.
A. Criminal Investigation
1. Arrest. Article 33 of the Constitution advances the basic premise that
arrests should be based on a warrant issued by a competent judicial officer
specifying the offense with which the person is charged. 70 The constitutional
provision contains one exception to that general requirement, however:
Persons who are apprehended while committing an offense (genkahan) are
subject to immediate arrest without warrant. 7' The Code defines persons who
are committing or who have just committed offenses as flagrant offenders
subject to arrest,72 but also treats by analogy certain classes of persons as
flagrant offenders (jun-genk6han): (1) persons being freshly pursued; (2)
persons carrying criminally acquired matter, weapons, or other objects
apparently used in connection with the offense; (3) persons bearing on their
bodies or clothing visible traces of the offense; and (4) persons who flee when
69. PENAL CODE art. 6. See Dando, supra note 47, at 250-51.
70. The warrant must be issued before a person is apprehended and not afterwards. CODE OF
CRIM. P. art. 199(1). If the predicate offense is minor, an arrest warrant may issue only if the person
to be arrested has no fixed residence or has failed to appear without good reason before a public
prosecutor, public prosecutor's assistant officer, or judicial police official when summoned under
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 198. Id. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 313.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of bekken taiho, an arrest for one crime
under a warrant designed to ensure detention while another more serious crime is investigated.
However, the Tokyo District Court ruled the practice an "evasion" of Articles 33 and 34 of the
Constitution and thus unlawful. Japan v. Tsukamoto, 591 HanreiJih6 30 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Feb. 26,
1970) (acquitting the accused). See also 37 Kokeishil 98 (Osaka H. Ct., Apr. 19, 1984), discussed in
Cleary, Criminal Investigation in Japan, 26 CAL. W.L. REV. 123, 140-41 (1989) (concluding that if arrest
is based on one crime but interrogation relates to another, the arrest is to be considered as if it were
based on the latter).
71. 1947 CONST. art. 33 proviso.
72. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 212(1). Any person, whether private citizen or public service
employee, can execute such a flagrant offense arrest. Id. art. 213. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 310;
Cleary, supra note 70, at 138-40 (discussing Tokyo High Court precedent on duration of offense for
purposes of flagrant delict arrest).
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challenged. 73 Based on only a reading of the constitutional language, this
code section might appear to stretch the wording of Article 33, but the
provision appears to be almost universally accepted as valid.74
The Code 75 also authorizes emergency arrests (kinkyfi taiho) in cases
involving serious offenses 76 if exigent circumstances prevent the issuance of
an arrest warrant in advance. Immediately after such arrests, however, steps
must be taken to obtain ajudicial arrest warrant; if none is issued, the suspect
must be released from custody immediately. 77 Although questions have been
raised concerning the constitutionality of the provision under Article 33, it
has been upheld by the Supreme Court.78
Neither the Constitution nor the Code directly addresses the question of
the use of force in executing an arrest. 79 However, under the Police Duties
Law,80 police officers may display weapons when it appears reasonably
necessary to apprehend a criminal, prevent the escape of an arrestee, protect
the officer or a third person, or quell resistance to the execution of the
officer's official duties. 81 Injury can be inflicted through the use of a police
weapon only when: (1) the case falls within the Penal Code provisions
establishing the necessity defense 82 or the defense of averting imminent
danger;83 (2) a person subjected to a flagrant or quasi-flagrant delict arrest for
an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for life or a term exceeding
three years resists arrest or attempts to escape (or a third person intervenes
for the purpose of enabling the arrestee to escape), and the officer believes on
sufficient grounds (s6t6 na riya) that no other means will suffice to effectuate
the arrest or forestall escape or interference;8 4 or (3) the officer is enforcing a
warrant or order for arrest or detention on a person who resists or attempts to
escape (or a third person intervenes for either purpose), and the officer has
sufficient reason to believe no other means will suffice to effectuate the arrest
or forestall escape or interference.8 5
73. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 212(2).
74. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 310-11. The concept, derived from Continental European
systems, see id. at 311, had been a part of the Code of Criminal Instruction of 1882, seeJ. DE BECKER,
supra note 38, at 401; see also 1927 CODE OF CRIM. P.
75. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 210(1).
76. Predicate offenses must be punishable by imprisonment with or without forced labor for life
or a term of three years or more. Id.
77. Id. The usual criteria for issuance of a warrant under Article 210(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure govern Article 210(2).
78. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 316-17 (citing and discussing precedent).
79. The United States Supreme Court has developed a doctrine that limits the use of deadly
force in arrests on the premise that injury or death is a form of seizure of the person that must meet
the constitutional reasonableness requirements of the fourth amendment. See Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
80. Police Duties Law, Law No. 163, 1954.
81. Id. art. 7 (main clause). See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 309.
82. Police Duties Law art. 7 (main clause) (referring to PENAL CODE art. 36). See S. DANDO, supra
note 61, § 6.06.
83. Police Duties Law art. 7 (main clause) (referring to PENAL CODE art. 37). See S. DANDO, supra
note 61, § 6.07.
84. Police Duties Law art. 7(i).
85. Id. art. 7(ii).
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Whatever the statutory basis for an arrest, the Constitution expressly
requires that an arrested person be informed immediately of the charges on
which arrest and detention are based. 86
2. Searches and Seizures.
a. Search limitations. Article 35(1) of the Constitution of Japan is
substantially equivalent to the warrants clause of the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution in providing that "[t]he right of all persons to be
secure in their homes, papers and effects against entries, searches and
seizures shall not be impaired, except upon warrant issued for adequate cause
and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be
seized." 87 Although there is no precise equivalent to the "reasonableness"
clause of the American fourth amendment, 88 a somewhat similar aim is
accomplished through a cross-reference in Article 35(1) to the provisions of
Article 33 requiring arrest warrants other than in instances of flagrant delict.89
The Code is the source of the detailed provisions of Japanese law
governing searches and seizures. In contrast to United States law, which
tends in practice to restrict the use of search warrants to the investigative
phase of criminal proceedings, 90 Japanese criminal procedure envisions the
use of judicially approved orders for search and seizure throughout the
pendency of criminal proceedings. However, one should note an important
procedural distinction, significant in a number of contexts,9' between
suspects (higisha) and accused persons (hikokunin). Under U.S. law, the term
"suspect" functions primarily in an informal or functional sense,92 and the
86. 1947 CONST. art. 34. See also CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 203(1), which, in addition to requiring
information about the "essential facts of the crime," mandates mention of the fact that the arrested
person is entitled to select a defense attorney and to submit any explanation he or she wishes. See S.
DANDO, supra note 1, at 314, 315. However, these procedures are accomplished not by the public
prosecutor's assistant officer or by the judicial police officer who made the arrest, but by the judicial
police officer to whose custody the arrested person has been transferred under Article 202 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. This does not appear to be viewed as infringing the "at once" (tadachi
ni) mandate of Article 34 of the Constitution.
87. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
88. The American clause provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." Id.
89. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text. See also Japan v. Arima, 15 Keishfi 915 (Sup.
Ct., G.B., June 7, 1961) (search incidental to and at time and place of arrest).
90. There is, of course, no temporal limitation built into, at least directly, the American law of
searches and seizures, although there is some incongruity in the jurisdictional allocation in Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 (a) of the competence of courts of record to issue search warrants to
federal magistrates or state judges if trial jurisdiction has vested in a district court based on the filing
of an indictment or information. For the most part, procedures for discovery, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16,
and issuance of subpoenas duces tecum, id. and FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (c), including grand jury subpoenas,
are the usual methods of achieving functions equivalent to search warrants following the formal
commencement of adversary criminal proceedings.
91. See, e.g., infra notes 133-179 and accompanying text (detention), notes 222-245 and
accompanying text (counsel).
92. In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the United States Supreme Court used the
terminology of "focus on a particular suspect" as critical to the attachment of sixth amendment-
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formal procedural status of "defendant" or "accused" arises only with the
formal initiation of adversarial criminal proceedings through a complaint or
other provisional pleading. 93 Japanese doctrine, in contrast, is patterned on
the classical European legal construct and draws a significant line between
suspects and accused persons, at times with reference to the existence or
nonexistence of rights, 94 and even more frequently concerning competence to
accomplish procedural acts.
This latter distinction is demonstrated in the area of judicial authorization
of searches, seizures, and inspection 95 as provided in the Code. Before the
initiation of criminal trial proceedings through the filing of an accusatory
instrument, 96 applications for warrants of search, seizure, and inspection are
submitted to a judge and not a court.97 After an accusatory instrument has
been submitted, however, the responsibility for issuance of an order of search,
seizure, or inspection lies with the court itself (saibansho), not with an
individual judge (saibankan). 98
based controls on custodial interrogation. However, that constitutional rationale was swiftly
replaced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with a doctrine derived from the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Escobedo has not survived as an independent
criterion for determining the constitutionality of interrogation in instances in which the sixth
amendment right to counsel has not yet attached. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438 (1974);
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).
93. This has been dealt with primarily concerning the applicability to interrogation of the sixth
amendment right to counsel, see, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474
U.S. 159 (1985); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), and lineup procedures, see, e.g., Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); cf Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (due process fairness is the exclusive prerequisite for identification
procedures conducted before the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings).
94. That is strikingly true in comparing the rights accorded to "accused persons" in Article 37
of the 1947 Constitution, particularly regarding the right to counsel, see infra notes 222-45 and
accompanying text, with those set forth for the populace generally in Articles 33 through 35 of the
1947 Constitution.
95. Inspection (kensh6) is a procedure for the discovery of facts, CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 128, and
includes personal (physical or mental) examinations, autopsies, exhumations, destruction of property
(for purposes of access to other material or as necessary to the performance of other acts of
inspection and other necessary acts). See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 275-77, 319-20; H. TAMIYA,
CHUSHAKU KEIJISOSH6H6 (COMMENTARIES ON CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE) 149 (1980).
On precedent relating to urinalysis pursuant to court order, see Cleary, supra note 70, at 146-47
(discussing Japan v. Goto, 34 Keishfi 300 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 23, 1980)) (finding the process lawful
because it had been implemented by a doctor in a hospital); cf Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966) (no fourth amendment violation in blood-testing under aseptic circumstances).
96. See CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 247, 256; S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 346-47.
97. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 218(1) (on application of a public prosecutor, public prosecutor's
assistant officer, or judicial police official, when necessary for the investigation of an offense).
98. These powers inhere in the individual official and are not derived from his or her formal
procedural affiliation with a court. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 57. One also should note a second
usage generally translated as "judge," namely, an official category of governmental official (hanji),
which is significant in terms of appointment and status. See Court [Organization] Law (Saibanho),
Law No. 59, 1947, arts. 39-40 (appointment and dismissal of Supreme Court Justices and judges of
inferior courts), art. 43 (qualification for appointment as assistant judge (hanjiho)); S. DANDO, supra
note 1, at 49. Accordingly, a hanji or hanjiho, depending on the circumstances, may perform
procedurally significant acts as a saibankan independent of a court or may function as a saibansho if
constituting a single-judge court under Court Law art. 26(1) (district court), art. 31-4 (family court),
or art. 35 (summary court).
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In applying for a warrant or order authorizing the examination of a
person, an official 9 must establish the necessity for the examination, as well
as the gender and the physical condition of the person to be examined.' 00
The particularity requirements of the Constitution' 0 ' are supplemented by
Code requirements governing the contents of a warrant or order. 0 2 In
addition, the issuing court or judge must authorize expressly any nighttime
searches, seizures, or examinations.i1 3 Certain privileges must be respected
when issuing search and seizure authorizations, 10 4 and caution must be
maintained to safeguard confidentiality and avoid harm to the reputation of
anyone subjected to a search or seizure. 10 5
Designated classes of officials are authorized to conduct limited searches
and seizures without advance judicial authorization. Police officers are
empowered to conduct a search of an arrestee's person for dangerous
weapons following any form of arrest under the Code. 10 6 Public prosecutors
and their assistant officers, or judicial police officials who carry out an arrest
under warrant or based on a flagrant delict arrest also may "search, seize or
inspect" at the situs of the arrest.' 0 7 Articles dropped or left behind by
anyone (including a suspect or accused person) may be seized, and no formal
99. An applicant must be a public prosecutor, a public prosecutor's assistant officer, see Public
Prosecutor's Office Law (Kensatsucho h6), Law No. 61, 1947, art. 27, or a judicial police official,
CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 218(1). The term "judicial police official" (Shih6 kensatsu shokuin) is a term
of criminal procedural significance, id. arts. 189(1), 190, separate from the governmental
employment status of persons appointed as police officers under the Police Law (Keisatsu h6), Law
No. 162, 1954. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 97-99; R. RINALDUCCI, JAPANESE POLICE
ESTABLISHMENT 121, 206, 221-23 (1973).
100. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 218(4).
101. 1947 CONST. art. 35(1).
102. CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 107, 219; RULE OF CRIM. P. (KEIJISOSH6 KISOKU), Supreme Court R.
No. 32, 1948 art. 155.
103. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 116; but see id. arts. 116(2) (allowing execution commenced before
sunset to continue after), 117 (excepting searches of places deemed to be used habitually for
gambling, lotteries, or other acts prejudicial to good morals, or inns, restaurants, or other places to
which the public has access during the nighttime, but only during the hours such establishments are
open to the public), 222(4)-(6) (equivalent limitations on warrants or orders of inspection).
104. For example, certain persons against whom orders of seizure have been issued under Article
99(2) of the Code ("a court may designate articles to be seized and order the owner, possessor or
custodian thereof to produce them") may legally refuse to turn over the designated matter. See id.
arts. 104 (consent of Diet House or Cabinet required before compliance, if the person against whom
process has been directed is a member of either); 105 (specific professional and religious
functionaries may refuse to comply with seizure orders, provided the protected individual has not
consented to release of materials sought, and the refusal to accede to the process is not intended to
shield an accused who is not a protected client at the time).
105. RULE OF CRIM. P. art. 93. If a search warrant is to be executed against the person of a female
in other than exigent circumstances, another adult woman must be present. CODE OF CRIM. P. art.
115.
106. Police Duties Law art. 2(4).
107. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 220(l)(ii). Without an authorizing warrant, the authorities can also
enter a residence or premises, buildings, or vessels under the control of persons for the purpose of
searching for a suspect. Id. arts. 220(l)(i), 220(3). See generally Cleary, supra note 70, at 144-46
(discussing lower court precedents relating to search activities incidental to arrest). For discussion of
precedent sustaining the constitutionality of police photography of demonstrators and occupants of
speeding vehicles under Article 13 of the 1947 Constitution, which guarantees the dignity of the
individual and the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, see id. at 135-36.
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procedures are required concerning anything voluntarily produced or
surrendered by its owner, possessor, or custodian.' 08
b. Secrecy of communications. The Constitution, perpetuating but
considerably strengthening a concern in the Meiji Constitution, 0 9 states that
the secrecy of any means of communication is not to be violated. " t0 Although
the constitutional language appears unqualified, the Code provides for court
orders to seize or produce mail, telegrams, or other communications if a
suspect or accused was either the transmitter or recipient."i' Other
communications must relate to the case in question before a court or judge
may authorize their seizure."t 2 Although the constitutional right of privacy
embodied in Article 21 is implicated in these Code provisions, the provisions,
nonetheless, generally seem to be considered constitutional.' 13
c. Exclusion of evidence. The sole reference the Constitution makes to the
exclusion of evidence is a provision requiring the exclusion of confessions
that do not meet mandated standards. 114 This rule would have no
applicability, for example, to evidence seized in violation of Article 35.
However, the Supreme Court of Japan apparently has recognized that an
exclusionary rule can be applied to the fruits of an unlawful search if such
exclusion would be necessary to deter unlawful police activity.' 1 5 The Code
of Criminal Procedure requires that evidence obtained incidentally to an
emergency arrest must be returned immediately if an arrest warrant is not
obtained afterwards." 6 That rule is not, however, an exclusionary rule as
such. t" 7
d. Interrogation. The Constitution provides that confessions made under
compulsion, torture, or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention, are
108. CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 101, 221.
109. MEIJI CONST. art. 26 (except in instances set forth in law, the secrecy of letters of Japanese
subjects must remain inviolable). See H. ITO, supra note 32, at 54 (opening or destruction of letters
"will not be tolerated, except in matters of criminal investigation or in times of war or of emergency,
or in cases specified by express provisions" of law); N. MATSUNAMI, supra note 16, at 253 (identical
language to Prince Ito's).
110. 1947 CONST. art. 21(2), final clause. On potential constitutional issues concerning
wiretapping, see Cleary, supra note 70, at 136-38.
111. CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 100(1), 222.
112. Id. arts. 100(2), 222. Notice must be given to the sender or addressee unless there is fear
that notification may obstruct the underlying criminal procedures. Id. art. 100(3).
113. See, e.g., S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 270; H. TAMIYA, supra note 95, at 124.
114. 1947 CONST. art. 38(2); CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 319(1). See infra note 118 and accompanying
text.
115. Japan v. Hashimoto, 32 Keishfi 1672, 1682-83 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Sept. 7, 1978), discussed in
Dando, supra note 43, at 645. The Court's rationale was similar to that of the United States Supreme
Court in, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
116. CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 210, 220(2). See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
117. Compare a motion for return of property under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(e)
with a motion to suppress evidence under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12, 41(f). See also H.
TAMIYA, supra note 95, at 246.
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inadmissible as evidence. 81 8 That rule, of course, fixes an important level of
protection for both suspects and accused persons, because the ban covers
confessions without regard to the procedural status of their makers at the time
they were made. However, certain statutory provisions must be considered in
determining the status of interrogation under Japanese law.
Under the Police Duties Law, police officers are empowered to stop and
question persons under specified circumstances: (1) when the officers have a
rational basis to determine that individuals have committed or are on the
point of committing crimes; 1 9 and (2) when, on the same basis, individuals
are thought to have information about crimes that have been or are about to
be committed.' 20 If the officer considers the location of the encounter
disadvantageous to the information source or an obstruction to traffic, the
individual may be requested to accompany the officer to a nearby police
station, police box, or residential police box for questioning. 121 However, a
requested individual is under no duty to accompany the officer elsewhere or
to answer any questions at either the original location or a police facility to
which the officer and individual have repaired. 122 If an individual refuses to
cooperate, a police officer may take only one of the measures allowed against
informants who are not suspects or accused persons in the case to which their
information relates. 12 3
118. 1947 CONST. art. 38(2), restated in part in CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 319(1). Representative
precedents on voluntariness include Japan v. Okayama, 24 Keishti 1670 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 25,
1970) (effect of psychological pressures on voluntariness);Japan v. Abe, 20 Keishfi 537 (Sup. Ct., 2d
P.B., July 1, 1966) (confession involuntary in light of public prosecutor's representations concerning
possibility of suspension of institution of prosecution); Japan v. Okamura, 18 Keish6i 177 (Sup. Ct.,
2d P.B., June 1, 1964) (polygraph alone did not make confession involuntary, but involuntariness
existed on the basis of the entirety of circumstances). See also Armstrong, supra note 14, at 194-97.
Derivative evidence arguably is included in the ban. See H. TAMIYA, supra note 95, at 362-63.
119. Police Duties Law art. 2(1) ("goriteki ni handan shite ... utagau ni tariru s6t6 na riyu no
aru"). On searches incidental to the exercise of this power, see Cleary, supra note 70, at 133-34.
120. Police Duties Law art. 2(1).
121. Id. art. 2(2).
122. Id. art. 2(3). See generally Cleary, supra note 70, at 130-31 (discussing precedents on stopping
and questioning under the Police Duties Law), 131-33 (discussing traffic stop precedents).
123. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 307-08. Persons other than suspects can be asked to appear at
the office of a public prosecutor, public prosecutor's assistant officer, or judicial police official for
questioning concerning a case under investigation. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 223(1). The individual is
under no duty to comply with the request to appear or to remain after questioning, id. arts. 223(1),
198(1), but if the individual makes a statement it may be reduced to protocol form and read to the
source, id. arts. 223(2), 198(3)-(4). The source may sign and seal the protocol if he or she affirms it is
true, but is under no duty to do so. Id. arts. 223(2), 219(5). If the individual refuses to appear or
disclose the information in his or her possession, the public prosecutor can request a judge to
question the individual before the first day of public trial, at which the accusatory instrument takes
formal effect. Id. art. 226. If the individual has given a statement to an investigating official under
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 223(1) and the official believes the individual may be subjected
to pressure to alter or withdraw the statements if testifying at public trial, and the testimony will be
essential to proving the guilt of the accused, the official can ask that the individual be questioned by a
judge as a witness before the first day of public trial. Id. art. 227(1). The applicant official must make
a prima facie showing of the grounds of necessity. Id. art. 227(2). A judge granting the request
possesses the same powers as a court or presiding judge that examines a witness, id. art. 228(1), and
the judge may allow the accused person or suspect, or defense counsel, to be present, id. art. 228(2).
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A public prosecutor, public prosecutor's assistant officer, or judicial police'
official can request a suspect to appear for questioning if it is considered
necessary to an investigation. 24 If the suspect appears, the investigating
official must inform the individual that he or she is not required to make a
statement against his or her will.125 If the suspect makes a statement, it is
reduced to protocol form and read to the suspect for verification; changes are
entered as additional material in the protocol.1 2 6 Any protocol so obtained is
admissible into evidence at trial as a document containing a statement made
by the accused person. 2 7
B. Detention and Release
The Constitution contains no express provision supporting a claim to bail
or other form of preconviction release. Instead, Article 34 prohibits detention
without adequate cause, and requires that, upon the demand of someone in
detention, the grounds for detention be established in open court in the
presence of the detainee and the detainee's counsel. 28 Because these
requirements are, in a sense, peripheral rather than central, determinations of
custody versus liberty are made in accordance with the detailed provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. Once again, the formal legal distinctions
between suspects and accused persons1 29 are essential to a determination of
claims to release.
The Anglo-American andJapanese criminal justice systems approach from
theoretical bases that are polar opposites the question of which suspects or
accused should be held in custody and which should be released. The Anglo-
American system assumes that almost all criminal proceedings will commence
with the arrest of offenders; only in a small fraction of criminal cases will the
first significant procedural act be the issuance of a grand jury indictment,
followed by the issuance and execution of a bench warrant for the arrest of an
indicted person.' 30 Hence, although some commentators advocate the
124. Code of Crim. P. art. 198(1). The individual is under no duty to appear or remain, however,
unless he or she is under arrest or in detention at the time. Id. See generally Cleary, supra note 70, at
124-26.
125. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 198(2). The warning does not extend, however, to the right to
withdraw under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 198(1).
126. Id. art. 198(4). If the suspect affirms the correctness of the contents of the protocol, he or
she is asked to sign or seal it, but the suspect may refuse to do so. Id. art. 198(5).
127. Id. art. 322(2) (The document is admissible, provided the statement appears to have been
made voluntarily.). Even should that provision not apply, a protocol or statement could be admitted
with the concurrence of the court, the public prosecutor, and the accused person, id. art. 326, or used
for impeachment purposes under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 328. See generally S. DANDO,
supra note 1, at 306-07.
128. Article 34 of the 1947 Constitution also requires that persons under arrest or detention be
informed immediately of the charges lodged against them. The provision was not implicated when a
foreigner was required to remain in an airport hotel while authorities inquired into his eligibility to
remain in Japan. Japan v. Bye (phonetic based on katakana), 617 HanreiJih6 25 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B.,
June 25, 1971).
129. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
130. FED. R. CRIM. P. 9. If a state has replaced grand jury indictment procedures with a
preliminary examination-information system, the initiation of criminal proceedings through ab initio
indictment is exceptionally rare.
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greater use of summons in lieu of arrest,' 3 ' the primary focus of
contemporary Anglo-American criminal procedure has been on the release 'f
offenders following arrest and production, and the constitutionality of the so-
called preventive detention designed to protect victims, witnesses, evidentiary
data, and the community against injurious activities.' 32 In contrast, the
theoretical premises on which the Japanese system rests are that persons will
remain free, whether before or after an accusatory instrument has been filed,
unless affirmative action is taken by public prosecutors, their assistant officers,
or judicial police officials to request a judge or a court (depending on the
stage of a criminal prosecution) to terminate that state of freedom. Either the
Anglo-American or the Japanese system could be administered to achieve
about the same ratio of nonrestrained and detained persons-in the United
States by increased use of preventive detention, as well as by the traditional
manipulation of bond amounts imposed on defendants where that remains
possible, and in Japan by increasing the frequency with which detention
orders are sought against suspects and accused persons.
1. Detention Before Initiation of Public Trial Proceedings. As discussed earlier, 33
arrests ordinarily must be accomplished pursuant to a warrant issued by a
judge or court; only flagrant delict and emergency arrests constitute
exceptions. After a judicial police officer has either arrested a suspect or
received custody from another arresting officer,' 3 4  the officer must
immediately release the individual if further custody is unnecessary, or
transfer the custody of the suspect to a public prosecutor within forty-eight
hours.' 35 Failure to transfer the suspect within that time necessitates his or
her immediate release.' 3 6 A similar forty-eight-hour limit governs public
prosecutors who have made arrests or received custody of arrested suspects
from public prosecutors' assistant officers; they must seek a detention warrant
from a judge, file an accusatory instrument within forty-eight hours, or release
the suspect at the expiration of that period. 137
131. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 10-2.1 to 2.3 (citations by police in lieu of arrest),
10-3.1 to 3.4 (summons in lieu of arrest warrant), and commentary (2d ed. 1980).
132. See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3142 (West Supp. 1989), discussed in,
e.g., 1 B. GEORGE, COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984, ch. 2 (1984 & 1990 Supp.). The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the basic constitutionality of the preventive detention aspects
of the law in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
133. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
134. Public prosecutor's assistant officers who have arrested persons pursuant to warrants must
immediately transfer custody of the arrestees to a public prosecutor, and judicial police constables
must transfer custody of arrestees to a judicial police officer. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 202. Similar
procedures are mandated when a flagrant delict arrest has been consummated. Id. arts. 214-215.
135. Id. art. 203(1). The suspect must be informed immediately of the essential facts of the crime
or crimes concerning which charges have been made, as well as the right to select defense counsel,
id., unless the suspect already has retained counsel, id. art. 203(2). In the latter event, no notification
concerning that right is needed. Id. Precedents on the length of questioning before arrest are
discussed in Cleary, supra note 70, at 126-28.
136. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 203(3). See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 314-15.
137. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 204. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 315-16. Immediate release
is required before the expiration of the 48-hour period if the public prosecutor perceives no need to
keep the suspect in custody. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 204(1).
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If a public prosecutor has received custody of an arrested suspect and if
the case documents have been transferred to him or her from a judicial police
officer, the public prosecutor must release the suspect immediately if there is
no perceived need to continue the suspect in custody, or within twenty-four
hours either obtain a judicial detention order 38 or institute prosecution. 3 9 If
the time limit is not met, the suspect must be discharged from custody
immediately.' 40 Accordingly, when custody initiated by a judicial police
officer is followed by a transfer of an arrested suspect and case documents to a
public prosecutor, seventy-two hours is the maximum length of custody
permitted without authorization by ajudge. 14'
If for unavoidable reasons a prosecution cannot be commenced within the
forty-eight, twenty-four, or seventy-two-hour time limits, a public prosecutor
can request a judge to detain the suspect, based on a prima facie showing of
the reasons for noncompliance with the time limits. 142 The recipient judge
must find that the asserted grounds existed before a detention order can
issue. 143
When a judge has received a request to detain a suspect, the judge 144 must
issue an order of detention unless he or she determines there is no ground for
detention or no justification for a failure to meet the Code's time limits on
detention. 45 Arguably, a judge should refuse a prosecutorial request for
detention if detention does not appear necessary, even though legal grounds
exist to support detention. 46 If a detention order issues, it is valid for ten
days, 147 within which public prosecution must be initiated or an extension
order must be obtained. 148 Based on a finding of unavoidable circumstances,
the judge may extend the detention order for an additional time not to exceed
ten days. 149 Accordingly, in almost all cases, the maximum period of
precharging detention is twenty-three days,' 50 but in certain sensitive
138. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 205(1). See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 315.
139. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 205(3).
140. Id. art. 205(4).
141. Id. art. 205(2).
142. Id. art. 206(1).
143. Id. art. 206(2).
144. The judge has the same powers as a court addressing the detention of an accused person
under Article 60 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (based on Article 207(1)), except that the judge
cannot fix bail. Id. art. 207(1). The reason for the limitation is found in the brief duration of
detention before public prosecution begins. See infra notes 147-52 and accompanying text. See also S.
DANDO, supra note 1, at 318.
145. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 207(2).
146. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 317-18.
147. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 208(1).
148. Id. art. 208(2).
149. Id.
150. The maximum is three days if a judicial police officer has transferred custody and documents
to a public prosecutor, followed by a ten-day initial period of detention, followed in turn by an
extension order not to exceed ten days in length.
Detention during this phase can be in a detention center (k6chisho) or a police custody cell
(ryfichisho), but even after the institution of public prosecution, police custody cells may be
designated as substitute houses of detention (daiyo kangoku) under Article 1(3) of the Prison Law,
Law No. 28, 1908. An important practical consequence of the latter is that suspects and accused
persons can be held in facilities administered by police authorities and not a prison or detention
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cases' 5 1 an additional period of detention not to exceed five days can be
authorized based on a showing of unavoidable circumstances. 152
2. Detention Following Institution of Prosecution. If public prosecution is
instituted against persons not in detention, the normal practice is to send a
summons to them requiring them to appear before the court.' 53 If there is
noncompliance with a summons or apprehension that an accused person may
not comply without good reason, 154 or if the accused person has no fixed
dwelling, 155 the court before which prosecution has been initiated is
authorized to produce (k6in-suru) an accused person.' 5 6 After the warrant of
production issued by the court has been executed and the accused person has
been brought before the court, 157 custody may continue for only twenty-four
hours unless a warrant of detention has issued during that period.' 58
Detention is allowed on the basis of sufficient reasonable grounds to
suspect that an accused person has committed an offense and that at least one
of three specified grounds is present: (1) the accused person has no fixed
dwelliag; (2) there is sufficient reasonable ground to suspect the accused
person may destroy evidence; or (3) the accused person has escaped or there
is sufficient reasonable basis to suspect that he or she may do so. 159 The basic
maximum period of detention is two months from the date of the institution
of prosecution. 160 However, in any criminal prosecution, one extension of
one month's duration can be ordered at the expiration of the initial two-
center administered by the Ministry ofJustice. This has been alleged as a reason for significant abuse
of the rights of detainees. See Nakayama, National Report ofJapan, 49 R. INT. D.P. 217, 225-32 (1978);
Saito, "Substitute Prison": A Hotbed of False Criminal Charges in Japan, 2 KONAN U.J. Soc. Sci. 51, 59-61
(1988).
151. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 208(2) (crimes concerning insurrection); PENAL CODE arts. 77-80
(insurrection), 81-88 (foreign aggression), 92-94 (foreign relations), 106-07 (riot).
152. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 208(2).
153. Id. art. 57. Summons practice is delineated in Articles 63 and 65 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. The fixed minimum period between notice and appearance is 12 hours, RULES OF CRIM.
P. art. 67(1), but an accused person can chose to appear before the 12 hours have passed, id. art.
67(2). Presence most usually is for the purpose of participation in public trial proceedings, but also
can be used for other purposes like a physical examination of an accused person. Id. art. 102. See
generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 254.
154. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 58(ii).
155. Id. art. 58(i).
156. Id. art. 58 (main clause).
157. For the procedures governing production, see id. arts. 64, 66-76. Upon production, an
accused person must be given immediate notice of the alleged facts (in summary form), the right to
counsel if counsel has not been selected, and the right to request appointment of counsel based on
financial inability or other reason. Id. art. 76(1). See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 254-56.
158. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 59. Before the first day of public trial proceedings, detention matters
continue to be dealt with by a judge (not the court), who possesses the same authority as a court or
presiding judge. Id. arts. 280(1), (3).
159. Id. art. 60(1). However, when relatively minor offenses are charged, the sole basis for
detention is lack of a fixed residence. Id. art. 60(3). Unless an accused person has escaped, a court
cannot order detention until after it has informed the accused person of the charges and has heard
his or her statement concerning them. Id. art. 61. For the procedures relating to warrants of
detention, see id. arts. 70-74, 77. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 258; Armstrong, supra note
14, at 190-94. On conditions of detention, see CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 78-81; S. DANDO, supra note 1,
at 257.
160. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 60(2).
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month period, based on a finding of concrete grounds necessitating
continued detention. 16' Moreover, one-month extension orders can be
obtained, without a limitation on the maximum number of extensions, if any
of the following grounds exists: (1) the charged offense is punishable with
death or imprisonment with or without forced labor for life or a minimum
term exceeding one year; 162 (2) the accused person habitually has committed
offenses punishable by imprisonment with or without forced labor for a
maximum term of three years or more;' 63 (3) there is sufficient reasonable
basis to suspect that the accused person may destroy evidence; 164 or (4) the
name or residence of the accused person is unknown.1 65
3. Release from Detention.
a. Lack of grounds for continued detention. The Constitution requires that,
at the demand of the person in detention, the cause for detention be indicated
in open court in the presence of the accused person and his or her counsel. 166
That requirement is set forth in detail in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which provides that either an accused person in detention 67 or certain
designated persons acting on her or his behalf' 68 may request an indication of
the grounds for detention. 169 As required by the Constitution, the indication
of grounds must be accomplished in open court' 70 with judges 171 and court
clerks in attendance. 72 The constitutional mandate that the proceedings be
accomplished in the presence of the accused person and defense counsel is
repeated, with certain specified exceptions.' 73 After the proceedings have
been opened, the court must afford opportunities to a public prosecutor, the
accused person, defense counsel, and any person who may have submitted a
161. Id.
162. Id. (referring to id. art. 89(i)).
163. Id. (referring to id. art. 89(iii)).
164. Id. (referring to id. art. 89(iv)).
165. Id. (referring to id. art. 89(vi)).
166. 1947 CONST. art. 34. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
167. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 82(1).
168. Requests may be submitted by a defense counsel, legal representative, curator, spouse,
lineal relative, sibling, or other interested person. Id. art. 82(2).
169. If, before action can be taken on the request, the detainee is released on any basis (release
on bail, suspension of the enforcement of a warrant of detention, or rescission or loss of effect of the
warrant), the request becomes inoperative. Id. art. 82(3). If two or more requests are submitted
concerning the same detention, action is taken on the first one submitted and the rest are dismissed
by a ruling after reasons for detention have been indicated. Id. art. 86.
170. Id. art. 83(1).
171. If the predicate charges are determined by a collegiate court, all members participate in the
process, id. art. 85, although the presiding judge communicates the grounds for detention, id. art.
84(1).
172. Id. art. 83(2).
173. Id. art. 83(3). Indication procedures may continue if an accused person is unable to appear
because of unavoidable circumstances (such as illness) and consents to the proceedings in his or her
absence, or if the accused person does not object to proceedings in the absence of defense counsel
who fails to appear. Id. This rather clearly rests on a theory of waiver of the constitutional
requirements.
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request on behalf of the accused person to state their views on the matter. 74
If the reasons underlying the original warrant of detention no longer pertain,
the court must rescind the warrant of detention immediately 75 if the accused
person has not already been released on some other basis.' 7 6
A public prosecutor, an accused person in detention, or persons acting on
his or her behalf also may request rescission of a warrant of detention based
on termination of the grounds or necessity for detention. 7 7 This request
differs in form from the special procedure requesting an indication of reasons
for detention. 178 A court is also required to rescind a warrant of detention (or
grant release on bail) on the application of anyone authorized to request bail
or on the court's own motion, if a warrant of detention has been in force for
an unreasonable period. 79
b. Bail. Either an accused person in detention, or his or her defense
counsel, legal representative, curator, spouse, lineal relative, or sibling may
request release on bail,' 80 unless the accused person has been released in the
interim. 18 ' The Code purports to create a plenary right to release on bail,' 82
but allows bail to be denied on any of the following grounds: (1) the charged
offense is punishable with death or imprisonment with or without forced labor
for life or a minimum term exceeding one year; (2) the accused person has a
previous conviction of a serious offense; (3) the accused person habitually has
committed offenses punishable by imprisonment with or without forced labor
for a maximum term of three years or more; (4) there is a sufficient reasonable
basis to suspect that the accused person may destroy evidence; (5) there is a
sufficient reasonable basis to suspect that the accused person may inflict
personal injury or property damage on or commit a threatening act toward
the victim or someone else deemed to have information needed for the trial of
the case, or a relative of either; or (6) the name or residence of the accused
person is unknown.' 83 Bail must be granted if a warrant of detention has
174. Id. art. 84(2). The presiding judge, however, may order the submission of written, rather
than oral, statements if that is deemed appropriate. Id. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 260-
61.
175. This is not explicit in the context of the procedure in question, but is provided for in Article
87(1) of the ensuing Code of Criminal Procedure. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 261.
176. See CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 87(2); cf supra note 169 (release renders request inoperative).
177. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 87(1).
178. A person who is physically restrained not in accord with proper legal procedure may apply
to a court for relief. Habeas Corpus Law, Law No. 199, 1948, art. 2(1). Any other person can do the
same on behalf of the confined individual. Id. art. 2(2). Normally, however, this is to be done
through an attorney as representative. Id. art. 3. There is no "exhaustion of remedies" requirement
in the Habeas Corpus Law, cf 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West Supp. 1989), so that procedures under it
constitute a full-fledged alternative to the indication of grounds procedures in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, described in the main text above. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 261; 3 KODANSHA
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPAN 73 (1983).
179. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 91(1).
180. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 88(1). See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 265-67.
181. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 88(2).
182. Id. art. 89, main proviso. A court also may grant bail on its own motion if it deems that
appropriate. Id. art. 90.
183. Id. art. 89.
[Vol. 53: No. 2
RIGHTS OF THE CRIMINALLY ACCUSED
been in effect for an unreasonably lengthy period. 84 A court must hear the
views of a public prosecutor before it determines to grant or reject a request
for release on bail. 185
With one exception,' 86 the only authorized form of release is on money
bail;1 87 the Code does not provide for release on personal recognizance with
or without condition.' 8 8 The court must set bail' 89 in an amount appropriate
to assure the presence of the accused person, in light of the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the strength of the evidence against the accused
person, and the character and financial ability of the accused person. i90 Once
the decision has been entered to allow bail, the court can impose restrictions
on the place of residence of the accused person and set any other conditions
on release which the court considers proper.' 9 ' However, at least some
nominal bail seemingly would have to be set as a prerequisite to the
imposition of conditions on release.
Bail can be tendered by either an accused person or someone else, if the
court allows;' 92 the court may also accept negotiable securities or a written
undertaking submitted by someone other than the accused person, as
approved by the court. 193 A ruling granting release on bail does not become
effective until the bail deposit has been accomplished. 94
Bail, or the suspension of the enforcement of a detention order, can be
rescinded upon the request of a public prosecutor or on the court's own
motion, if any of the several grounds enumerated in the Code has been found
to exist.' 95 The court can renew the bail ruling, but if it is rescinded, the court
can order the forfeit of some or all of the money or other property in the
184. Id. art. 91(i).
185. Id. art. 92(1).
186. A court in its discretion may suspend the enforcement of a warrant of detention and entrust
the accused person under detention to the charge of, for example, a relative or a protective
institution, or restrict the residence of the accused person. Id. art. 95. See generally S. DANDO, Supra
note 1, at 267-68.
187. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 93(1).
188. But see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(b), (g) (West Supp. 1989). See I B. GEORGE, supra note 132,
§§ 2.06-07. In some instances, matters that would be dealt with in the United States on the basis of
release with or without conditions could be addressed through rescission or suspension of an order
of detention. Consideration also should be given to the device of suspending prosecution under
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 248. See Armstrong, supra note 14, at 197-200; Foote,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan: A Response, 5 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 96, 102-06 (1986); George, supra
note 36, at 269-70; Goodman, Exercise and Control of Prosecutorial Discretion in Japan, 5 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 16, 36-43, 48-53 (1986).
189. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 93(1).
190. Id. art. 93(2). On the meaning of "strength of the evidence," see S. DANDO, supra note 1, at
266.
191. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 93(3).
192. Id. art. 94(2).
193. Id. art. 94(3).
194. Id. art. 94(1).
195. Id. art. 96. The specified grounds are satisfied when the accused has: (1) failed to appear,
without good reason, when summoned; (2) fled, or there is sufficient reason to believe that he or she
is about to flee; (3) destroyed evidence of the crime, or there is sufficient reason to believe that he or
she is about to do so; (4) inflicted or tried to inflict personal injury or property damage upon or
performed intimidating acts toward the victim, some other person deemed to have information
necessary to the trial of the case, or a relative of either; or (5) failed to abide by restrictions on
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custody of the court. 19 6 The accused person also is returned to detention
under procedures established in the Code. 197 If there is no rescission or
default, the deposited funds or securities are returned to the accused
person.' 9
4. Contemporary Constitutional Issues. It is doubtful that the present system of
preconviction detention and release contravenes the provisions of Article 34
of the Constitution; constitutional issues would come to the fore only if the
Supreme Court of Japan were to embark upon an expansive interpretation of
Article 31, converting it clearly into a due process clause on the American
pattern and extending it aggressively into the area of procedure just
examined. Such a development appears exceedingly unlikely. Moreover,
even if it did so, analogies to United States Supreme Court precedent would
offer no support for an invalidation of the Japanese system; fourth
amendment probable cause suffices to support detention on judicial order,199
and denial or revocation of release pending adjudication, based on
determinations of danger of injury or death to victims or witnesses, of
destruction of evidence, or of other serious danger to the community or the
administration of criminal justice, violates neither the eighth amendment bail
clause nor due process of law.2 0 0 If there is any deficiency in the Japanese
system, it probably lies in the unavailability of any form of claim to release
during periods of arrest or custody before the institution of criminal
prosecution. 20' Nevertheless, as noted, that does not violate either Article 34
or Article 31 under the prevailing limited construction of those provisions.
Nevertheless, private sources in Japan, notably the Japan Civil Liberties
Union ("JCLU"),20 2 have attacked the present detention and release system,
primarily in reliance on the fact that in 1979 Japan ratified the International
Covenants on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and Civil and Political
Rights.20 3 The principal contentions of theJCLU are that the Japanese law as
applied20 4 violates provisions of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant on the
production and release of arrested and detained persons 20 5 and the
residence or other conditions on release fixed by the court at the time bail was granted. Id. See
generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 266-67.
196. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 96(2). This can also be done on motion of a public prosecutor when
the accused person has fled or failed to appear. Id. art. 96(3).
197. Id. art. 98. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 267.
198. RULES OF CRIM. P. art. 91. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 292 n. I 11.
199. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 116-19 (1975).
200. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
201. See supra notes 133-52 and accompanying text.
202. JAPAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CITIZENS' HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (1985) (portions of which
are translated in 20 LAW IN JAPAN 30-73 (1987)) [hereinafterJCLU REPORT].
203. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 8-15 (1983) (U.N.
Publ. Sales No. E.83.ZIV.1) [hereinafter CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS COVENANT]. See Repeta, The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Human Rights Law in Japan, 20 LAw IN JAPAN 1, 2-3.
204. See JCLU REPORT, supra note 202, at 64-73.
205. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS COVENANT, supra note 203, art. 9(3). Anyone arrested or
detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized
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presumption of innocence. 20 6 Whether the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant is self-executing and paramount to the detention and release
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 20 7 is a matter the Japanese
courts ultimately will have to resolve. However, particularly as far as the
"presumption of innocence" premise is concerned, if Japan is in violation of
international standards, then so is the United States, for the United States
Supreme Court has clearly held that the so-called presumption relates
exclusively to the prosecution's burden of persuasion at the trial of criminal
charges.2 08
C. Institution of Public Prosecution
The Constitution is silent concerning the mechanism by which formal
criminal charges are to be instituted. 20 9 Under the Code of Criminal
Procedure,2 10 prosecution is commenced through filing a written accusatory
instrument with a competent court.2 11 Accused persons are promptly served
with a copy of the instrument, 2i 2 summoned to appear,2 13 and expected in
most instances to be present so that trial proceedings can commence.2i 4 Upon
by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.
It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release
may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and,
should occasion arise, for the execution of the judgment. Id.
206. Id. art. 14(2). See also JCLU REPORT, supra note 202, at 73.
207. See Repeta, supra note 203, at 3-7.
208. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-86
(1978); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). Cf McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 486
U.S. 429, 436 (1988) (protection disappears after conviction; defendant-appellant assumes burden of
convincing appellate tribunal that reversible error occurred at trial).
209. This contrasts with the fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which requires grand jury
indictments in federal capital or "otherwise infamous cases." The latter is taken to mean felonies (in
federal practice, crimes punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year); misdemeanors may be
prosecuted through information. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). The fifth amendment grand jury
requirement is not incorporated in fourteenth amendment due process, Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1884); therefore, states may eliminate the grand jury system or place it on a standby status.
210. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 256.
211. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 346-47. For a discussion of the competence of courts,
see id. at 60-63.
212. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 271.
213. Id. art. 273(2). Defense counsel is also notified. Id. art. 273(3).
214. The basic premise is that accused persons are required to be present at all trial proceedings.
Id. art. 286. Juridical persons are, of course, allowed to appear through an authorized representative.
Id. art. 27(1). There are, however, certain exceptions to the basic premise: (1) if the case involves an
offense punishable by a fine of 5,000 yen or a minor fine, an accused person is not required to be
present, id. art. 284 (although obviously, in this circumstance or any of the circumstances described
below, he or she has a right to attend if desired); (2) if the charged offense is punishable by penal
detention and the court considers the appearance of an accused person unnecessary for the
protection of the accused person's rights, it may permit the accused person to be absent on a day of
public trial, but that does not extend to the rendition ofjudgment, id. art. 285(1); (3) if an offense
carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment with or without forced labor for three years or less or a
fine of 5,000 yen or less, an accused person is allowed to be absent under the same circumstances as
in (2) above, but that does not extend to the first day of public trial and the public trial date at which
judgment is rendered, id. art. 285(2); (4) if an accused person, otherwise possessed of the right to
attend but in detention, is summoned to appear but refuses without proper grounds to appear and
makes it exceptionally difficult for a custodial officer to bring him or her to court, the court can
proceed with trial proceedings, including those at which judgment is announced, on that particular
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the opening of public trial proceedings, a public prosecutor must read aloud
the accusatory instrument; 21 5 the presiding judge must then notify the
accused of certain rights2 1 6 and afford both the accused and defense counsel
an opportunity to make any statements they desire concerning the case. 217
One may note in this context the issue ofjudicial sanctions against abusive
prosecutions, which the Supreme Court of Japan has recognized in a limited
way. In its Kawamoto judgment, 218 the Court ruled that abuse of prosecutorial
discretion can constitute a bar to prosecution, but that such abuse must be
egregious enough to constitute criminal activity. 21 9 The abuse of discretion in
Kawamoto did not reach that level, but the Court nevertheless refused to
exercise its powers of reversal based on incompatibility with justice 220 to
upset the Tokyo High Court judgment 22 1 that had dismissed the prosecution
as not founded in law.
D. Counsel
Article 37(3) of the Constitution provides that "criminally accused
persons"(keijihikokunin) at all times have the right to the assistance of
competent counsel, which must be provided by the government if the accused
are unable personally (mizukara) to obtain it.222 The legal dichotomy
between suspects and accused persons, discussed earlier,2 23 once again is
critical: the constitutional right to counsel in Japan governs only after the
occasion only, id. art. 286(2) (The same provision would govern each occasion on which a qualifying
accused person is obstreperous, but a separate determination would be required each time.); (5)
accused persons can be ordered to leave the courtroom temporarily during the examination of
witnesses against whom they may exert pressures affecting testimony, id. art. 304(2); (6) judgment
may be pronounced in the absence of accused persons who leave the court without permission or
have been ordered from it by a presiding judge based on disorderly conduct, id. art. 341; and (7)
judgments in favor of accused persons who are mentally ill can be rendered in their absence, id. art.
314(1) proviso. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 369-70.
215. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 291(1).
216. The notification extends principally to the right to remain silent and to refuse to answer any
questions. Id. art. 291(2). However, under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the presiding judge
also must advise an accused person of the right to make statements that may be used either for or
against the accused person. Id. art. 197(1). The presiding judge also has discretion to explain any
other protective procedural rights that an accused person appears unable to understand fully. Id. art.
197(2).
217. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 291(2). Japanese courts may order public prosecutors to disclose
documents and evidentiary material in their possession, which perhaps is the closest approach to
compelled discovery in Japanese practice. See Dando, supra note 43, at 644-45.
218. Japan v. Kawamoto, 34 Keishfi 672 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Dec. 17, 1980). See generally George,
supra note 36, at 274-76; Upham, Japan v. Kawamoto: Judicial Limits on the State's Power to Indict, 13
LAW IN JAPAN 137 (1980).
219. See PENAL CODE art. 194 (abuse of authority in the form of arrest or detention by public
service official performing or assisting in the performance of judicial, prosecutorial or police
functions).
220. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 411 (ii) (Seigi ni hansuru).
221. Japan v. Kawamoto, 853 HanreiJiho 3 (Tokyo H. Ct., June 24, 1977).
222. A limited right of access by retained counsel to a suspect undergoing investigation while in
detention appears to have been acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Sugiyama v. Osaka
Metropolitan Prefecture, 32 Minshu 820 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., July 10, 1978).
223. See supra notes 91-98, 129 and accompanying text.
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institution of public prosecution. Before that time, the claim to counsel is
purely statutory under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Under the Code, suspects as well as accused persons may select or retain
counsel at any time.224 Notification of that right must be given at frequent
intervals throughout the course of criminal proceedings,2 25  and the
Constitution requires that accused persons in detention be afforded
opportunities to choose counsel.2 26 Counsel selected while the accused is a
suspect continues to be recognized throughout trial proceedings, 227 but
representation must be ascertained separately for successive proceedings. 228
Suspects who are financially or otherwise unable to retain counsel, or
whose legal representatives or designated relatives2 29 fail to do so on their
behalf, have no claim to appointment of counsel at public expense. After the
institution of public prosecution, however, if accused persons do not have
counsel, they can request the court to assign counsel. 230 Moreover, even if
the accused persons are financially able, courts on their own motion may
designate counsel for accused persons unrepresented by counsel, 23' if they
are minors, aged seventy years of age or older, deaf or mute, 232 or of doubtful
mental capacity, 23 3 or where the court deems designation of counsel
necessary for any other reason. 234 When criminal prosecution is based on
serious charges, public trial proceedings cannot be conducted without
defense counsel in attendance, 235 and the presiding judge must appoint
224. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 30(1). Legal representatives, curators, spouses, lineal relatives, or
siblings of either accused persons or suspects also have an independent right to select counsel,
whether or not that is the desire of those on whose behalf counsel is retained. Id. art. 30(2). See
generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 105-06.
225. See CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 76 (notice given appearance on production), 77 (notice given
before detention), 203 (notice given following arrest on warrant by judicial police officer), 204
(notice given following arrest on warrant or receipt of custody by public prosecutor), 211 (notice
given following emergency arrest), 216 (notice given following flagrant delict arrest), 272 (notice
given upon initiation of public prosecution).
226. 1947 CONST. arts. 35, 37(3).
227. Id. art. 32(1).
228. Id. art. 32(2). A court may restrict the number of attorneys representing a suspect, id. art.
35, but may do so with reference to those representing accused persons only on the basis of special
circumstances, id. proviso. The basic number is three unless the court establishes the existence of
special circumstances for both suspects, RULES OF CRIM. P. art. 27(1), and accused persons, id. art.
26(1). When accused persons are represented by multiple counsel, the court designates one as chief
defense counsel. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 33; RULES OF CRIM. P. arts. 19-24. Powers of chief defense
counsel, deputy chief defense counsel, and associate defense counsel are delineated in Article 25 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 106.
229. See supra note 226.
230. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 36.
231. Id. art. 37. Cf FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) ("[Elvery defendant who is unable to obtain counsel
shall be entitled to have counsel assigned . . . at every stage of the proceedings .... ).
232. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 37(iii) (designating in asha as eligible, a term also important under
Penal Code Article 40 in determining culpability). See S. DANDO, supra note 61, at § 7.03 n.l.
233. The terms in Article 37(iv) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are "loss of mind" (shinshin
s6shitsu) and "weakness of mind" (shinshin gojaku). These, too, are critical under Article 39 of the
Penal Code in determining culpability and should have identical meaning in both contexts. See S.
DANDO, supra note 61, § 7.03(1).
234. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 37(v).
235. Id. art. 289(1) (applicable to offenses punishable by death or imprisonment with or without
forced labor for life or a maximum term exceeding three years).
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counsel if the accused person is unrepresented 23 6 or counsel fails to
appear. 23 7 Counsel costs ultimately are met by the government for financially
unable accused persons. 238
Because Article 37(3) of the Constitution requires "competent counsel,"
defense counsel must be admitted to practice under the Lawyers Law.2 39 The
powers of counsel are delineated in the Code of Criminal Procedure 240 and
appear to be ample from the standpoint of forensic activities to protect the
rights and claims of accused persons. However, there is one major point of
controversy: the circumstances of counsel interviews with suspects or accused
persons in detention. The basic premise is that counsel or attorneys who will
become defense counsel can interview their clients without custodial
personnel present and may deliver and receive documents or other matter
without restriction. 24 ' However, prosecutors and judicial police officials are
allowed to designate the times and places of interviews with, and delivery of
items to and from, suspects if these limits on interviews and deliveries are
necessary to the investigation and do not improperly limit defense
preparations. 242 The defense bar has asserted that police and prosecutors
abuse the power of general designation by severely restricting the dates,
hours, frequency, and duration of visits and by requiring attorneys to obtain
permits from the public prosecutor's offices according to inconvenient
administrative procedures. 243 Once more, the contention is that the Civil and
236. Id. art. 289(2).
237. Id. art. 290.
238. Assigned counsel have the right to demand traveling expenses, per diem, lodging expenses
and a fee, id. art. 38(2); Criminal Costs Law art. 7; Temporary Law Concerning Criminal Costs art. 3,
all of which are included as costs of the prosecution, Criminal Costs Law art. 1. However, these costs
are not to be imposed on an accused person financially unable to pay them. CODE OF CRIM. P. art.
181(1) proviso. If they have been imposed, an accused person can request that enforcement be
remitted wholly or in part, based on financial inability. Id. art. 500. On that basis, the Supreme
Court held that the provisions of the Criminal Costs Law were not contrary to Article 37(3) of the
1947 Constitution. Japan v. Sudo, 4 KeishfO 966 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,June 7, 1950) (before the enactment
of the proviso to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 181).
239. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 31 (1). In summary, family, and district courts, persons not qualified as
practicing attorneys may be selected with the permission of the court, but these laypersons may serve
only as supernumerary counsel in district courts, where one defense counsel must be a practicing
attorney. Id. art. 31(2). Accused persons also can designate a legal representative, curator, spouse,
lineal relative, or sibling as an assistant (hosanin). Id. art. 42(1). After notifying the court of the
appointment for each trial instance, id. art. 42(2), the assistant can perform all procedural acts that an
accused person can as long as this does not violate the expressed wishes of the latter or run counter
to legal requirements, id. art. 42(3). See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 110-11.
240. CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 31(1) (selection of counsel), 38(1) (assigned counsel).
241. Id. art. 39(1). The delivery of items to and from suspects is subject to reasonable restrictions
in the interests of forestalling escape, the destruction or alteration of evidence, or the introduction of
material that may interfere with institutional security. Id. art. 39(2). See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at
109.
242. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 39(3) (public prosecutors, public prosecutor's assistant officers,
judicial police officers, and constables are accorded the power of designation). See S. DANDO, supra
note 1, at 109-10; Cleary, supra note 70, at 141-43 (discussing civil litigation in which attorney failed
to obtain a civil recovery from the government for asserted unlawful interference with client
interviews).
243. See, e.g., JCLU REPORT, supra note 202, at 56-61; Saito, supra note 150, at 58-59; Tamiya, On
the Designation of Communication with Counsel, 4 LAw IN JAPAN 87 (1970). A related alleged abuse is
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Political Rights Covenant 244 forbids a continuation of these restrictions
derived from Article 39(3) of the Code. However, the prospects of Supreme
Court adoption of such a premise appear most dim, as the JCLU appears to
recognize in calling for legislative attention to the problem. 245
E. Multiple Convictions for the Same Offense
Article 39 of the Constitution states that no person shall be held criminally
culpable more than once for the same matter (ichijifusairi). 246 The Japanese
concept is derived from the Roman law tradition, 247 as is demonstrated by the
fact that the protections of Article 39 do not attach until all appeals in regular
course have been completed or forgone. Hence, the Supreme Court ofJapan
ruled 248 that Article 351(1) of the Code, which allows both a convicted
accused person or a public prosecutor to lodge an appeal against a judgment,
is constitutional; the Court indicated expressly that Article 39 does not
incorporate Anglo-American doctrines.249
If a repeated prosecution should be initiated in contravention of Article
39, the remedy is a judgment of acquittal on procedural grounds.250
arrest on different charges (bekken taiho) as a device to obtain an additional period of twenty-three
or twenty-eight days of detention. See supra notes 70, 150; JCLU REPORT, supra note 202, at 60 n.*.
244. Supra note 203, art. 14(3) (accused persons have the minimum guarantee "in full equality:
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of [their] defence and to communicate
with counsel of [their] own choosing .... ").
245. SeeJCLU REPORT, supra note 202, at 62-63.
246. The cumulative imposition of a tax deficiency penalty and a penal fine does not violate the
provision. Japan v. Kotobukiya K.K., 12 Minshfl 938 (Sup. Ct., G.B., April 30, 1958). Cf United
States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (civil penalty cumulating to over 300 times the actual cost
imposed through fraud on government was a criminal penalty within the meaning of double
jeopardy).
247. Although the term ichiifusairi is usually translated as "double jeopardy," the concept is
closer to the Roman law concept of non bis in idem than to Anglo-American double jeopardy, so that
the latter term ought not be used for ichyifusairi lest it create confusion on the part of uninitiated
persons.
248. Japan v. Ishizaki, 4 Keishfi 1805 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Sept. 27, 1950), translated in COURT AND
CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1948-60, at 219 (. Maki ed. 1964)
[hereinafter J. MAKI].
249. Under the United States Constitution's fifth amendment double jeopardy clause, jeopardy
attaches injury cases when the jury is empaneled and sworn, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978), and
in bench trials when the first prosecution witness is sworn, Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388
(1975) (the point at which a court begins to "receive evidence"). United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977). If authorized by statute, appeal by the prosecution is possible,
before jeopardy attaches, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1982), a practice approved in Serfass, or when the
prosecution is challenging sentences imposed unlawfully, United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117
(1980); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(b) (West Supp. 1989) (prosecution appeals based on downward
departures from federal sentencing guidelines), or when the prosecution is appealing to a
jurisdiction's highest court after a defendant has prevailed in an intermediate appellate court. No
counterpart concerns are evident in the Japanese or other Roman law-derived systems because of the
deferred point at which the non bis in idem doctrine ripens.
250. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 337(i). See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 240.
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F. Speedy Trial
The Constitution guarantees a speedy trial. 25 1 However, as in the United
States, 252 the constitutional barrier to protracted trial does not rise swiftly. 25 3
With the exception of trials that can be completed in two days or less and that
are to be conducted without recess, courts are simply admonished to try to
carry on continuous trials. 254 Despite the admonition, first-instance trial
proceedings can extend for months or years before the entry of judgment. 255
Protracted criminal proceedings may not matter much to accused persons
who are not detained, but one may question whether that is so if they are held
in detention for significant periods. Nevertheless, the amount of concern
expressed over the matter seems modest.
G. Public Trial
Under the Constitution, accused persons are accorded a right to a public
trial; 2 56 trials are to be conducted and judgments pronounced in open
court, 2 57 subject to quite limited exceptions. 2 58 The right of publicity also
extends to protocols of trial, which are viewed as public records.2 59 The latter
251. 1947 CONST. art. 37(1) (jinsoku na saiban).
252. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). A similar balancing approach is evident in Japan
v. Nakasu, 29 Keishfi 393 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Aug. 6, 1975).
253. In Japan v. Boku (Paik), 26 Keish6 631 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 20, 1972), translated in H.
TANAKA, supra note 25, at 478, a sixteen-year suspension of trial proceedings forestalled resumption
of trial. If delay is viewed as not having affected the propriety of the judgment in a case, there will be
no reversal. See Japan v. Nagashima, 2 Keishfi 1853 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 22, 1948), translated in J.
MAKI, supra note 248, at 207. If the constitutional guarantee is violated, an accused may resort to
extraordinay relief procedures. See 26 Keish6 631. See generally Dando, supra note 43, at 641-42;
Suzuki, Speedy Administration of Criminal Justice: The Right of the Accused and the Interest of Society, 15
UNAFEI Resource Material Series 91, 92-93 (1978).
254. "As far as possible" (dekiru kagiri). RULES OF CRIM. P. art. 179(2).
255. For example, in 1986, 70.7% of the 63,718 district court cases were disposed of within three
months, an additional 2 1.8% in six months or less, and 5.3% more within a year. In summary courts,
97.8% of 15,398 cases were disposed of within a year. JAPAN MINISTRY OF JUSTICE RESEARCH AND
TRAINING INSTITUTE, SUMMARY OF WHITE PAPER ON CRIME 102 (1988).
256. 1947 CONST. art. 37(1).
257. Id. art. 82(1) (k6kai hotei). Reopening of procedure (saishin) proceedings are not within
Article 82(1). Japan v. Ueno, 12 Keishu 1683 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., May 27, 1958).
258. If trial proceedings do not involve political offenses or offenses involving the press
(shuppan) or relate to constitutional rights under Chapter III of the 1947 Constitution, they can be
conducted privately, as long as a court unanimously determines that opening the proceedings to the
public will endanger public order or morals. Id. art. 82(2). Trial proceedings relating to the
exempted classes of cases must always be open to the public, id. proviso, but it should be noted that
this does not apply to the pronouncement ofjudgment. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 360-61.
Before closing trial proceedings to the public, a court must state the reasons for closure. Court
Law art. 70. Spectators must be readmitted when judgment is pronounced. Id.
259. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 53(1). However, the provision is inapplicable if the process of
examination interferes with the preservation of trial records or the functions of a court or public
prosecutor's office. Id. Records relating to closed trial proceedings, see supra note 258, are
unavailable to persons other than those directly interested in the case or to others who have obtained
special permission from the custodian of those records. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 53(2). Preservation of
records and charges for inspection are covered by separate legislation. Id. art. 53(4); Law for
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To be constitutional, a trial also must be held before an impartial
tribunal. 26' Impartiality of judges and courts conducting specific trials is
promoted, of course, by the maintenance of the independence of the
judiciary. 262 In individual proceedings, however, it is advanced through the
system of recusal by judges who recognize their potential disqualification 263
or by challenges by either side, 26 4 the grounds for which are set forth in the
Code.26 5 Rather detailed provisions govern the processing of challenges.
2 66
Japan does not currently utilize a jury system or any other form of lay
participation in trial proceedings, such as is encountered in some Roman law-
derived systems. 267 For a time, Japan did in fact use a jury system patterned
significantly on the Anglo-American institution, 268 but the Jury Law was
suspended in operation in 1943269 and has not been revived to date. 270
Implementation of the Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at
361.
In Repeta v.Japan, 1299 HanreiJih6 41 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 8, 1989), the Supreme Court gave at
least qualified recognition to the right of individuals (in that instance, an American attorney) to take
notes in court about formal proceedings.
260. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (press access to preliminary
examination records).
261. 1947 CONST. art. 37(1).
262. Id. art. 76(3) ("all judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall
be bound only by this Constitution and the laws"). See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 49-50.
263. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 23(2); RULES OF CRIM. P. art. 13. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 60.
264. CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 21-25. Such challenges also may be made to court clerks on
substantially equivalent grounds. Id. art. 26. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 60. The time limitations
in Code of Criminal Procedure Article 22, governing challenges, do not violate the 1947
Constitution Article 37(1). Japan v. Kobayashi, 18 Keishfi 107 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Mar. 12, 1964).
265. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 20. The grounds are: (1) the judge is the victim; (2) the judge is or
was a relative of the accused person or victim; (3) the judge is a legal representative, supervisor of
guardianship, or curator of the accused person or victim; (4) the judge has acted as a witness or
expert witness in the case; (5) the judge has acted as a representative, counsel, or assistant of the
accused person; (6) the judge has exercised the functions of a public prosecutor or judicial police
officer in the case; or (7) the judge has participated in any of certain specified activities in the
preliminary phases of the case, other than as a requisitioned judge. The latter ground is not a
ground for challenging a court clerk, however. Id. art. 26(1).
266. See generally S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 59-60.
267. See J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 61-62, 63 (1977); A. VON
MEHREN &J. GORDLEY, CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 99 n.12 (2d ed. 1977) (French law); Kock, Introduction, in 7
AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, FRENCH CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 8-9, 10 (G. Kock
trans. 1964); Schmidt, Introduction, in 10 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES, GERMAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 4-5, 8, 17 (H. Neibler trans. 1965).
268. Baishinh6 (Jury Law), Law No. 50, 1923 (in force from Oct. 1, 1928). See generally S. DANDO,
supra note 1, at 18; S. Fujii, supra note 24, at 316-17; M. MIYAKE, OUTLINE OF THE JAPANESE JUDICIARY
7-8 (rev. 2d ed. 1935).
269. Baishinb6shih6 (Law Suspending the Jury Law), Law No. 88, 1943. See H. TANAKA, Supra
note 25, at 482-91.
270. Based on the author's conversations with representatives of Nichibenren (Japanese Federation
of Bar Associations), some members of that organization are exploring recommendations that the
jury system be revived.
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I. The Right to Have Witnesses Summoned
Under Article 37(2) of the Constitution, criminally accused persons have
the right to demand that witnesses be summoned for their benefit, according
to compulsory procedures and at public expense. 271 Under the Japanese
practice, a public prosecutor, accused person, or defense counsel wishing to
have witnesses examined submits a request to the trial court. 272 Although a
court has the power to examine any person as a witness, 273 it also has
discretion whether to grant all defense or prosecution requests that witnesses
be summoned. If the court believes that witnesses desired by either party will
offer irrelevant or cumulative data, it can refuse to summon them without
violating the guarantee of Article 37(2).274 If summoned witnesses fail to
appear, either a renewed summons or a warrant of production is issued to
compel their attendance. 275 It appears to be a matter of debate whether the
expenses generated for the government by the processes of summoning and
examining defense witnesses can be imposed on convicted defendants as costs
of trial, in light of the constitutional requirement that witnesses be summoned
at public expense.276
J. Presence and Examination of Witnesses
As discussed above,277 accused persons have a right to be present at trial,
although that right is expressed in the Code of Criminal Procedure and not
the Constitution. However, the Constitution guarantees accused persons an
opportunity to examine all witnesses,2 78 which at least implies a right to be
present.2 79 The right of examination is not limited to witnesses whom
accused persons have requested to be summoned to give testimony, but
271. Although the usual translation is "compulsory process," the author believes the paraphrase
in the main text of the phrase, "k6hei dejiko no tame ni ky~seiteki tetsuzuki ni yori shdnin o motomeru kenri o
yusuru," is closer in meaning to the original and less misleading, granted the different procedures and
degree ofjudicial involvement in the Japanese and United States systems. Compare CODE OF CRIM. P.
arts. 143, 150 to 153(2) (summons and production of witnesses) with FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (federal
subpoena practice).
272. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 298(1). For the procedural details, see RULES OF CRIM. P. arts. 188-
193. Discovery of the names and addresses of witnesses whose examination has been requested is
required. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 299(1).
273. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 143.
274. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 282 (citing precedent in accord).
275. CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 152 to 153(2). Witnesses who fail to respond without good reason
may also be punished by a fine or penal detention, id. art. 151, or subjected to a nonpenal fine and
liability for expenses generated by their nonappearance, id. art. 150.
276. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 299 n.9. Impecunious convicted persons can request a total or
partial remission of costs imposed upon conviction, CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 181(1), 500, but the
constitutional issue seems inescapable if convicted accused persons cannot invoke the remission
option.
277. See supra note 214.
278. 1947 CONST. art. 37(2) ("Subete no shdnin ni taishite shinmon suru kikai ojzibun ataerare ... kenri o
ytisuru").
279. In concept, the right to be present as a matter of U.S. constitutional law appears to be based
in due process of law to the extent that fairness of trial is the focus, but is either part of or derived
from the sixth amendment right of confrontation to the extent that opportunities to cross-examine
prosecution witnesses are contemplated. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
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instead extends to all witnesses summoned on a day of public trial.280 The
Code of Criminal Procedure was conceived of as initiating an adversarial
system of trial proceedings, during which direct and cross-examination of
witnesses physically present in court would be of crucial importance, 281 to
replace the earlier system in which documentary data were all-important. 28 2
Article 37(2) of the Constitution derives its primary significance from the
altered character of criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, the Code of Criminal
Procedure allows documents and statements to be used as evidence if a public
prosecutor and an accused person consent, 283 and allows stipulations to the
contents of documents or substance of testimony that witnesses might give if
they were to attend. 284 There are indications that documentary proof is
gradually replacing live witness testimony in many criminal cases; if that trend
becomes predominant, then the practical significance of the constitutional
provision will diminish.
K. Right of Silence
Article 38(1) of the Constitution protects all persons, whether suspects or
accused persons, from being compelled to testify against themselves. 285
Although there are modest differences in detail, the Japanese right of silence
and the American constitutional privilege against self-incrimination are
closely congruent. 286 The constitutional protection is implemented in the
Code of Civil Procedure 28 7 and the Code of Criminal Procedure. 28
Accordingly, most issues tend to be resolved in form as matters of statutory
interpretation and application rather than as constitutional questions. If there
280. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 304(2); S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 281-82. When documents or
demonstrative evidentiary data are offered, they are read or tendered at a day of public trial, CODE OF
CRIM. P. arts. 305 to 307(2), and the court must afford an appropriate opportunity to a public
prosecutor, accused person, and defense counsel to challenge the probative value, id. art. 308. See
generally Kim, Criminal Trial in Japan: The Accused's Right to Confrontation and Cross-Examination of
Witnesses, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR DR. CHIN KIM: SELECTED PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY COMPARATIVE
LAW 536 (1987).
281. See A. OPPLER, supra note 27, at 140-44.
282. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
283. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 326(1). Accused persons who are absent under circumstances
allowing trial procedures to be conducted in their absence, see supra note 214, are deemed to give
consent, provided no representative or defense counsel appears for them to give or withhold
consent. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 326(2).
284. Id. art. 327.
285. "Nambito mojiko nifurieki no kyjutsu o ky6yzi sarenai." 1947 CONST. art. 38(1).
286. See generally Armstrong, supra note 14, at 194-95; George, "Right of Silence" inJapanese Law, 43
WASH. L. REV. 1147 (1968), reprinted in THE JAPAN CONSTITUTION: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 1947-67,
at 257 (D. Henderson ed. 1968) [hereinafter George, Right of Silence]. See also S. DANDO, supra note 1,
at 280-81. In more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has held that neither information required
on customs forms, Japan v. Kawasaki, 33 Keishfi 301 (Sup. Ct., 3rd P.B., May 29, 1979), and in the
course of administrative inquiries relating to possibly delinquent taxes, Japan v. Hashimoto, 38
KeishfO 2037 (Sup. Ct., 3rd P.B., March 27, 1984), is compelled within the meaning of Article 37(1) of
the 1947 Constitution.
287. CODE OF CIVIL P. art. 280 (according any witness a right to decline to answer incriminating
questions).
288. CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 146 (right of witnesses to refuse to answer incriminating questions),
311(1) (right of accused person to remain silent at all times or to refuse to answer any question in the
course of trial).
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is a deficiency in the legislative system, at least from the government's
standpoint, it lies in the lack of legislative mechanisms to confer immunity on
witnesses so that they may be compelled to testify.28 9 Japanese criminal
procedural law also incorporates a number of evidentiary privileges that are
exclusively statutory and not constitutional in nature.290
L. Adjudication
The only express constitutional requirement affecting the rendering of
adjudications is that they be done publicly.29' Accordingly, the details and
alternative forms of adjudications in criminal cases are set by statute. 292 The
standard expectation is that judgment will not be rendered until an accused
person has been afforded an opportunity to submit a personal statement, but
that limitation does not pertain if an accused person has left court without
permission or has been ordered by the presiding judge to leave as a means of
maintaining order in court. 293
The Constitution is silent on the allocation and strength of the burden of
persuasion in criminal matters. 294 Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 295
if a public prosecutor fails to establish by sufficient proof that an accused
person committed a charged offense, the court must enter a judgment of
acquittal. Although Japanese judges follow the Roman law tradition of free
evaluation of evidence,2 96 that tradition in itself bears only on the judges'
independence in function. However, the judges also follow the principle of in
dubio pro reo, that is, the rule that all questions of doubt are to be resolved in
favor of an accused person.2 97 Although a precise comparative evaluation of
in dubio pro reo and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is probably
impossible, the author's qualitative belief is that innocent accused persons are
somewhat more strongly protected against unjust convictions in Japan than
under the American system of trial by jury.
289. See George, Right of Silence, supra note 286, at 1165-66. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005
(1982) (federal immunity legislation); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 50.10-30 (immunity other than for
grand jury witness), 190.40 (grand jury witness) (McKinney 1982).
290. See CODE oF CRIM. P. arts. 144-45 (official secrets), 147 (incrimination of spouses, relatives,
and others in designated close personal relationships to witnesses), 149 (designated professionals
possessing confidential information). S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 279-80.
291. 1947 CONST. art. 81(1); CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 342. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying
text.
292. CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 329-350. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 383-86.
293. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 351.
294. American constitutional doctrine has been developed under the due process clauses. See,
e.g., Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (contrasting civil and criminal contempt proceedings);
Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (allocation of burdens of establishing affirmative defenses); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970) (basic doctrine). The Supreme Court ofJapan might reach the
same position if it utilized Article 31 of the 1947 Constitution as a due process clause, but apparently
it has not done so thus far.
295. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 336. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 191-92.
296. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 318 (jiyfina shinsho). See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 174, 203-04.
297. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 191.
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One might note, incidentally, that under the system for resolving divisions
of opinion in collegiate courts under the Court Law2 98 when there is no
majority view, the opinion least favorable to an accused person is joined with
that next least favorable so that a majority is reached,2 99 at which point the
opinion of the two most favorable to the accused person becomes the
judgment of the court.
One additional point is worth mentioning in this context. Article 38(3) of
the Constitution prohibits the conviction or punishment of any person if the
sole proof against that person is his or her own adverse confession. Although
this might be viewed as accomplishing no more than the so-called corpus
delicti rule in Anglo-American criminal procedure, 30 0 applicable only to proof
of extrajudicial confessions, and though the Supreme Court of Japan ruled in
an early postwar case that Article 38(3) does not govern confessions in open
court,3 0 1 the Code of Criminal Procedure30 2 bars convictions based on an
admission of guilt in open court. Accordingly, there is no room for a guilty-
plea practice in Japan corresponding to that which is used sweepingly in the
United States. 303
Nevertheless, one may note two aspects of Japanese criminal procedure
that tend to accomplish somewhat similar results to guilty pleas. One is a
system of summary proceedings on minor charges in summary courts. These
proceedings can be precipitated by a public prosecutor's demand for a
summary order, which is legally equivalent to a judgment of guilt and which
can be entered if the accused person does not demand a formal trial within a
specified time after receiving notification of a summary order.30 4 By not
contesting a summary order, accused persons agree to the entry ofjudgment
without formal reception and evaluation of evidence.
The second method is simplified trial proceedings.30 5 After an accused
person has appeared at the opening of public trial, heard a reading of the
accusatory instrument by a public prosecutor, 30 6 and been notified by the
presiding judge of the right to make any statement concerning the case, 30 7 the
298. 1947 CONST. art. 77. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 231.
299. A collegial court for the trial of serious criminal cases always consists of three judges. Court
Law art. 26(2)(ii), (3). See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 54-55. However, trial proceedings do not
become ineffective because it is discovered toward the conclusion of trial proceedings that they
should have been conducted by a collegial court rather than by a single judge. CODE OF CRIM. P. art.
316.
300. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 205-06.
301. Japan v. Sato, 2 Keishfi 1012 (Sup. Ct., G.B., July 29, 1948). A confession of someone
jointly charged does suffice. Japan v. Yajima, 12 Keishfi 1718 (Sup. Ct., G.B., May 28, 1958). On
police efforts to obtain potentially corroborative evidence, see Cleary, supra note 70, at 128-29.
302. CODE or CRIM. P. art. 319(3).
303. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
304. See CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 461-470. Applications for formal trial must be submitted within
14 days after receiving a notification; if no application is submitted or an application is withdrawn or
dismissed, a summary order has the same effect as a formal judgment. Id. art. 470. See S. DANDO,
supra note 1, at 494-99. A similar special system governs minor traffic cases. See id. at 499-504.
305. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 377-79.
306. CODE OF CRIM. P. art. 291(1).
307. Id. art. 291(2).
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accused person is allowed to acknowledge guilt of one or more of the offenses
set forth in the accusatory instrument308 if the charges are not overly serious
in character. 30 9 If, after hearing the opinions on the matter of a public
prosecutor, accused person, and defense counsel, the court rules that
simplified trial proceedings will take place, the usual opening statement by a
public prosecutor is omitted,310 as is a determination of the scope, order, and
method of proof.31' The usual formalities relating to the examination of
evidence are dispensed with,31 2 and the court may examine evidence on
whatever basis it wishes.3 13 Thereafter, the procedures following the receipt
of evidentiary data, particularly closing statements and an adjudication, are
standard. 31 4 Once more, direct comparisons are difficult, but the author's
subjective reaction is that simplified trial proceedings do not differ
significantly from guilty-plea procedures conducted carefully under Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or a state counterpart, although
the guilty-plea procedures in the United States are more widely available than
simplified trial proceedings in Japan. 315
M. Appeal
As in U.S. constitutional doctrine,3 16 the Japanese Constitution makes no
specific reference to appeals. However, the Code of Criminal Procedure
contains elaborate provisions governing a number of procedures for appellate
review in criminal cases, 317 so that there has been no need to consider
whether an expanded interpretation of Article 31 would embrace at least one
instance of review on behalf of accused persons who have been convicted.
308. Id. art. 291(2).
309. The provision is inapplicable crimes punishable by death or imprisonment with or without
forced labor for life or a minimum term exceeding one year. Id. proviso.
310. Id. art. 296.
311. Id. art. 297.
312. Id. arts. 300-302, 304.
313. Id. art. 307(2).
314. If an order for simplified trial proceedings should be rescinded, regular trial procedures
should begin anew, unless a public prosecutor and the accused person or defense counsel decide not
to object to entry of an adjudication on the basis of simplified trial proceedings occurring before
rescission. Id. art. 315(2).
315. Rule 11 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contains no limitations on the gravity
of cases in which guilty and nolo contendere pleas can be tendered. On the limitations set by Japan
Code of Criminal Procedure art. 29(2) proviso, see supra note 309.
316. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894)
(dictum).
317. CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 351-434. See S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 408-48. There are also two
forms of extraordinary review following the conclusion of regular appeals: (1) reopening of
proceedings (saishin), CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 435-453; see S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 480-86; and (2)
extraordinary jjkoku appeal, CODE OF CRIM. P. arts. 454-60; see S. DANDO, supra note 1, at 486-89.
The Supreme Court took a relatively liberal view of the coverage of Article 435(vi) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, e.g. ,Japan v. Shiratori, 29 Keishfi 177 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., May 20, 1975), discussed
in Dando, supra note 43, at 645; Japan v. Taniguchi, 30 Keisha 1673 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Oct. 12,
1976), which has resulted in an increase in the frequency with which lower courts have granted saishin
relief. See Dando, supra note 43, at 645.
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CONCLUSION
The foregoing summary of the procedural status of, and constitutional and
statutory safeguards for, suspects and accused persons in Japan should
demonstrate that the protection of human rights there has reached a highly
advanced and sophisticated level. As under any system of procedural law,
constitutional and statutory provisions that purport to protect individuals can
be abused. However, the combination of a structure of government and
procedure that guarantees independence of prosecutoria 3 18 and judicial3 19
functions against political and community influences, and the high standards
of professionalism manifested in both branches of the criminal justice
system3 20 has limited instances of established or documented abuses to
generally tolerable levels. Modest amendments to the Code of Criminal
Procedure should eliminate most or all of those that have been identified. 32'
Consequently, the effective constitutional protection of the human rights of
the criminally accused may justly be viewed as one of the paramount
accomplishments of Japan's modern constitutional era.
318. See George, supra note 36, at 266-69.
319. See George, supra note 43, at 814-16.
320. See George, supra note 36, at 264-65; George, supra note 43, at 812-14.
321. One might note the extremely limited list of concerns incorporated in the final report of the
Commission on the Constitution. See COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 281-83, 384-85.
Page 71: Spring 1990]

